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ABSTRACT
The legal reasons that bind a judge and the moral reasons
that bind all persons can sometimes pull in different
directions. There is perhaps no starker example of such
judicial dilemmas than in criminal sentencing. Particularly
where mandatory minimum sentences are triggered, a
judge can be forced to impose sentences that even the judge
deems to be "immensely cruel, if not barbaric." Beyond the
direct victims of overly harsh laws, some courts have
recognized that 'judges who, forced to participate in such
inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and humanity as
well. "
When faced with such a judicial dilemma a powerful
tension between the judge's legal and moral reasons-the
primary question is what a judge can do to resolve it. We
argue that the two standard responses sacrificing
morality to respect the law ("legalism"), or sacrificing the
law to respect morality ("moralism")-are unsatisfying.
Instead, this Article defends an underexplored third
response: rather than abandoning one ideal to maximally
promote the other, we argue that judges should seek to at
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least minimally satisfy the demands of both. Judges should,
in other words, look for and employ what we dub
Satisficing Options. These are actions that enjoy sufficient
support from both the legal reasons and the moral reasons,
and thus are both legally and morally permissible-even if
the acts in question would not strictly count as optimal by
the lights of the law or morality.
This commonsensical response to the problem is not only
underappreciated in the literature, but also has great
practical import. Focusing on the sentencing context, this
Article demonstrates that judicial dilemmas can be
systematically resolved, mitigated or avoided through a
range of concrete strategies that on their own or in
conjunction can constitute Satisficing Options: these
strategies include seeking out legally permitted but morally
preferable interpretations of the law, expressing
condemnation of unjust laws in dicta, and seeking
assistance or cooperation from other actors to help
defendants facing substantively unjust mandatory
sentences. While these strategies can at times also go too
far, we argue that in certain contexts, they are sufficiently
defensible on both legal and moral grounds to be justifiable
responses to judicial dilemmas. This article thus provides
both a novel theoretical framework for understanding the
justification ofjudicial responses to unjust laws, as well as
a practical menu of options which judges can use to guide
their responses to the judicial dilemmas they are
increasingly likely to encounter within our criminal justice
system.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1989, Andres Magana Ortiz illegally entered the United States of
America. 1 He was fifteen. In the three decades since, he has led a
quiet, productive, responsible life: he ran a successful coffee business in
Hawaii, married a U.S. citizen, and fathered three children (all of whom
are U.S. citizens).2 On March 21, 2017, the U.S. government ordered Ortiz
to report for removal in the next month.3 Ortiz applied for a stay from the
district court, and when that was denied, he appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.4 His appeal was also denied.
Judge Reinhardt's concurring judgment in this decision was
remarkable. He noted that "the government conceded during the
immigration proceedings that there was no question as to Magana Ortiz's
good moral character", 6 that Ortiz is "currently attempting to obtain legal
status on the basis of his wife's and children's citizenship, a process that is
well underway," and that it "was fully within the government's power to
once more grant his reasonable request" for a stay.8 In denying that
request, "the government forces us"-that is, the judges and the court-
"to participate in ripping apart a family": 9
We are unable to prevent Magana Ortiz's removal, yet it is
contrary to the values of this nation and its legal system. Indeed,
1 Magana Ortiz v. Sessions, No. 17-16014, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. May 30, 2017)
(Reinhold, J., concurring), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/05/30/17-
16014.pdf.
2 Id. at 4-5.
3 Id. at 5.
4id.
5id.
6 d.
7 Id. at 6.
8Id.
9 Id.
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the government's decision to remove Magana Ortiz diminishes not
only our country but our courts, which are supposedly dedicated to
the pursuit of justice. Magana Ortiz and his family are in truth not
the only victims. Among the others are judges who, forced to
participate in such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and
humanity as well. I concur as a judge, but as a citizen I do not.10
Judge Reinhardt's concurrence is remarkable in three respects.
First, it candidly discusses the injustice of Ortiz's deportation. Second, for
how candidly it discusses the complicity of the courts and "judges who,
forced to participate in such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and
humanity."" Finally, the decision is remarkable for the media attention it
received, and the role it may well have played in leading to the
Department of Homeland Security's decision to grant Ortiz an 1 1 tIh hour
reprieve of 30 days on June 6, 2017.12
Judge Reinhardt and his colleagues on the Ninth Circuit faced what
we will call a judicial dilemma: a choice scenario in which a powerful
tension arises between the judge's moral and legal reasons, with each
group appearing to pull toward a different course of action. Regardless of
whether you think the right resolution of this case was clear, we take it
that there are many cases that are aptly described as judicial dilemmas.
The central issue we will tackle in this paper is: Can judicial dilemmas be
adequately resolved, and if so, how?
10 Id. at 7-8.
" Id.
12 Safia Samee Ali & Maria Paula Ochoa, Coffee Farmer Gets an 11th Hour Extension on
Day ofDeportation, NBC NEWS, June 7, 2017,
http://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/coffee-farmer-gets- 11th-hour-extension-day-
deportation-n77005 1. Shortly after the reprieve ended in July, Ortiz was deported.
William Cole & Susan Essovan, Kona Farmer says goodbye to family ahead of
deportation, HONOULU STAR ADVERTISER, July 8, 2017,
http://www.staradvertiser.com/2017/07/08/breaking-news/kona-coffee-farmer-says-
goodbye-to-family-ahead-of-deportation/.
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Our first task in pursuing this issue will be to clarify what a
judicial dilemma is. We will offer an account of the conceptual structure
of judicial dilemmas below: briefly, our view is that judicial dilemmas are
cases where the option for judges that is morally best (i.e. most supported
by the moral reasons) comes apart from the option that is legally best (i.e.
most supported by the legal reasons). A virtue of this account is that it is
maximally general. As we show, it is compatible with a wide array of
theoretical accounts of judicial dilemmas in the literature. Moreover, it
does not just apply to, say, immigration law. This matters because judicial
dilemmas can arise in a variety of areas of law. In fact, they are perhaps
most pervasive in criminal contexts, where judges are frequently forced to
make morally questionable decisions, especially in cases involving
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. Indeed, a decade ago, Judge
Reinhardt himself lamented that such a provision required him to affirm a
159-year sentence that he described as "immensely cruel, if not
barbaric." 1 3
13 United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (Reinhard, J., concurring).
In this case, Judge Reinhardt issued a concurring judgment that affirmed the "immensely
cruel, if not barbaric" 159-year term of incarceration for Marian Hungerford, because this
sentence was the mandatory minimum set by the relevant statutory provision (section
924(c)). Id. at 1120. Hungerford was an impecunious, unemployed 52-year-old woman
who had no criminal record and suffered from a severe form of Borderline Personality
Disorder. Id. at 1119. She was convicted of seven violations of section 924(c) for her
'extremely limited" role in conspiring in and aiding and abetting several armed
robberies-she had never held a gun. Id. Judge Reinhardt's judgment in Hungerford
illustrates one type of strategy for resolving judicial dilemmas: he expressed his
condemnation of the law he was legally required to enforce. See id. at 1118-23. And in
both cases, this strategy may have helped to yield welcome results. After a settlement
agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office, Hungerford was subsequently resentenced to
a 7-year term of incarceration that Chief District Judge Richard Cebull described as "no
more nor less than necessary" for her convictions. See Clair Johnson, Judge cuts 159-
year sentence in casino robbery case, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Oct. 27, 2010,
http://billingsgazette.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/judge-cuts--year-sentence-in-
casino-robbery-case/article_9c4c5966-ele4-1ldf-b934-001cc4c03286.html. Indeed,
Hungerford's resentencing and release from prison perhaps partly resulted from the
language in Reinhardt's concurrence, but it is more likely, in the words of U.S. Attorney
Mike Cotter, that this "just conclusion" was "the result of extraordinary efforts" by Judge
Virginia journal of Criminal Law
To frame our discussion, let us focus on United States v.
Angelos-a similar judicial decision by a trial court-as our paradigm
example of a judicial dilemma. 1 4 In 2002, Weldon Angelos, a 22-year-old
man with no criminal record, sold $350 worth of marijuana to a police
informant on three occasions. During two of these deals he was in
possession of a Glock. 16 When he was arrested, police found marijuana
and more handguns in his apartment and other locations they searched.17
Mr. Angelos was offered a plea bargain that recommended a prison
sentence of 15 years. He was told that if he refused the offer, he would be
charged with additional offenses, including five counts of possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of § 924(c),
which in total could leave Mr. Angelos facing over 100 years of
mandatory prison time.18
He refused the plea. 19 At trial, he was convicted of thirteen drug,
firearm, and money laundering offenses, as well as three violations of §
20924(c). In November 2004, Judge Paul Cassell of the U.S. Court for the
District of Utah sentenced Mr. Angelos to "a prison term of 55 years and
one day, the minimum that the law allows."21 Judge Cassell himself
described this sentence as "unjust, cruel, and even irrational." 2 2 So why
did he impose it?
Cebull, along with Hungerford's attorney Daniel Wilson and Assistant U.S. Attorney Jim
Seykora. Id.
14 United States v. Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d 1227 (D. Utah 2004), aff'd, 433 F.3d 738
(10th Cir. 2006).
15 Id. at 1231.
16 id.
17 Id.
s Id. at 123 1-32.
19 Id. at 1232.
20 Id. ("The jury found Mr. Angelos guilty on sixteen counts, including three § 924(c)
counts: two counts for the Glock seen at the two controlled buys and a third count for the
three handguns at Mr. Angelos' home.").
21 Id. at 1230.
22 id.
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Because he had to. Although the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
recommended a sentence of 78-97 months' imprisonment for the 13
offenses under other provisions besides § 924(c),23 Judge Cassell was
bound by statute to add to this 55 additional years for the firearms offenses
24under § 924(c). Section 924(c)(1)(A) provides that
any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence
or drug trafficking crime.. .uses or carries a firearm... shall, in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime... be
25sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years.
Furthermore, Section 924(c)(1)(C) ratchets up the mandatory minimum
sentences for subsequent violations of the statute:
In the case of a second or subsequent conviction under this
subsection, the person shall.. .be sentenced to a term of
26imprisonment of not less than 25 years.
Thus, Mr. Angelos's three violations of § 924(c) carried an
additional minimum sentence of 55 years: five years for the first violation
of this section, and 25 additional years for each subsequent violation.2 7
Cassell was deeply troubled by the severity of this required sentence in
light of Mr. Angelos's comparatively minor misconduct,28 and reduced the
sentence for the 13 offenses under other statutes from 78-97 months to just
a single day. 2 9 But this still left the additional 55 years' imprisonment for
23 Id. at 1232.
24 Id. at 1230 (finding that "this 55-year additional sentence is decreed by § 924(c)").
25 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).
26 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(C).
27 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
28 Id. (stating that the court believed the sentence to be unjust, cruel and irrational).
2 9 id.
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the three § 924(c) violations. Moreover, the court was compelled to reject
Angelos's constitutional challenges to his sentence: both his argument that
the sentence made "arbitrary classifications" in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause, 30 and his argument that the sentence
was cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.3 1
Judge Cassell's long and painstaking decision is evidence of the
intractable dilemma he felt he faced. On the one hand, Judge Cassell's
legal reasons required him to impose the applicable mandatory minimum
sentence. The law was relatively clear on this point. But on the other hand,
Judge Cassell also had weighty moral reasons 32 not to impose a
punishment that was, in his own words, "unjust, cruel, and even
irrational." 33 Intuitively, over half a century of incarceration is
disproportionate to the severity of Mr. Angelos's offense conduct; as the
court noted, his minimum sentence is more severe than the maximum
sentences for a number of violent offenses.34 This disproportionality is, on
many views, sufficient to make Angelos' sentence unjust.35 Moreover,
during his 55-year prison term, Mr. Angelos will be deprived of liberty,
30 Id. at 1235; see generally id. at 1239-56.
31 Id. at 1256-60.
32 As we explain in Part I, there are several possible grounds or sources of these moral
reasons. The harm to the defendant clearly is one. But another might be the duty to avoid
being complicit in injustices done by others. Thus, a judge faced with a case like Angelos
would plausibly have weighty moral reasons to avoid being complicit in the injustice of
applying overly stringent mandatory minimum laws to a defendant such as Mr. Angelos.
3 3 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1230.
34 Id. at 1245, n.88 (comparing the minimum sentence for Angelos (738 months), to the
maximum sentences for a kingpin of a major drug trafficking ring in which death resulted
(293 months), an aircraft hijacker (293 months), a terrorist who detonates a bomb in
public intending to kill bystanders (235 months), and a second-degree murderer (168
months)).
35 Proportionality principles are widely endorsed in the philosophical literature on
punishment. See Antony Duff & Zachary Hoskins, Legal Punishment, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2013).
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36social standing, and his right to vote. He will be exposed to unacceptably
high risks of serious sexual abuse,37 and he could face the torturous
conditions of solitary confinement for arbitrary reasons. 38 This is not to
mention the harms Mr. Angelos's punishment imposes on others-such as
the $1.3 million bill to the taxpayer. 39 It is unclear that these harms are
counterbalanced by, say, the general deterrent effects of Mr. Angelos's
36 American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards Committee, ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 3RD ED., COLLATERAL SANCTIONS AND DISCRETIONARY
DISQUALIFICATION OF CONVICTED PERSONS 7 (2004),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminaljustice section newsl
etter/crimjust standardscollateralsanctionwithcommentary.authcheckdam.pdf
("convictions will expose [defendants] to numerous additional legal penalties and
disabilities, some of which may be far more onerous than the sentence imposed by the
judge in open court. These 'collateral consequences of conviction' include relatively
traditional penalties such as disenfranchisement, loss of professional licenses, and
deportation in the case of aliens, as well as newer penalties such as felon registration and
ineligibility for certain public welfare benefits"); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM
CROW 142 (2011) ("Once labeled a felon, the badge of inferiority remains with you for
the rest of your life, relegating you to a permanent second-class status); Id. at 153
("Forty-eight states... prohibit inmates from voting while incarcerated for a felony offense
[and the] vast majority of states continue to withhold the right to vote when prisoners are
released on parole. Even after the term of punishment expires, some states deny the right
to vote for a [long] period....").
37 A study by the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics found that in 2011-12,
4% of federal and state inmates reported experiencing sexual abuse during the past 12
months. U.S. Department of Justice, Sexual Victimization in Prisons and Jails Reported
by Inmates, 2011-12, at 6 (May 2013),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svpjril 112.pdf.
38 Tim Heffernan & Graeme Wood, The Wrong Box, NAT. REV., April 20, 2015,
https://www.nationalreview.com/nrd/articles/416339/wrong-box; Atul Gawande,
Hellhole, THE NEW YORKER, March 30, 2009,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/30/hellhole.
39As Judge Myron Bright of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote in United States
v. Hiveley 61 F.3d 1358, 1363 (8th Cir. 1995), mandatory minimums require
"excessively long" sentences that "not only ruin lives of prisoners and often their family
members, but also drain the American taxpayers of funds which can be measured in
billions of dollars."
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punishment, since drug trafficking is notoriously difficult to deter.4 0
Of course, this only shows that laws imposing such mandatory
minimums are themselves often unjust. Skeptics of judicial dilemmas may
point out that it is still possible that judges also have weighty moral
reasons to apply the law even when it is unjust. In some cases, it might be
that a judge's all-things-considered moral duty is to obey even certain
unjust laws. Nonetheless, we contend that sometimes the balance of a
judge's moral reasons might require him not to apply specific immoral
laws that are beyond the pale, in which case there would be a genuine
conflict between the balance of the judge's moral reasons and the balance
of his legal reasons.41 A case like Angelos is about as good a candidate for
42such a scenario as can be found in this country. So we will continue to
treat it as our paradigm example of a judicial dilemma.
Cases like Angelos and the dilemmas they raise merit particular
scrutiny. In part, this is because the conflict between judges' moral and
legal reasons, as noted, is especially stark in criminal contexts involving
mandatory minimums. But it is also warranted for two other reasons. First,
judges have shown great ingenuity in exploring practical solutions to this
type of judicial dilemma, so considering what judges have done or could
do in criminal contexts is a profitable way to investigate what judges could
do to resolve judicial dilemmas in other legal contexts. The second reason
40 Estimates of this effect "are all over the place." Judge Jed S. Rakoff, Mass
Incarceration: The Silence of the Judges, THE N.Y. REV., May 21 2015,
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2015/05/21/mass-incarceration-silence-judges/. Still,
evidence does show that deterrence is largely ineffective vis a vis drug trafficking. See,
e.g., Vanda Felbab-Brown, Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug Trafficking
and Organized Crime: Concepts and Practicalities, INT'L DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM
(Feb. 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/drug-law-
enforcement-felbabbrown.pdf.
41 Regardless of whether one thinks a judge's moral and legal obligations can literally
come into conflict, at the very least there often is a powerful tension between judges'
moral reasons not to do injustice by applying unfair mandatory minimum laws, on the
one hand, and their legal reasons to apply the law as written, on the other.
42 It is easy to imagine even more clear-cut examples from Nazi Germany, for instance.
But our focus is the existing U.S. legal system.
103 [Vol. 6:1
2018] Resolving Judicial Dilemmas 104
is that we think judicial dilemmas in criminal contexts, and in particular in
criminal sentencing, are likely to become more pervasive in the near
future. This is due in part to Attorney General Jeff Sessions'
43Memorandum to Federal Prosecutors on May 10, 2017. Sessions' memo
directs federal prosecutors to "charge and pursue the most serious, readily
provable offense."44 That instruction marks a significant departure from
efforts by former Attorney General Eric Holder to limit federal
prosecutors in applying harsh mandatory minimum sentencing provisions
to non-violent drug offenders.45 Accordingly, judges appear likely to
encounter the sort of judicial dilemmas we analyze in this article, in cases
very much like Angelos, with increasing frequency in the years to come.
Some might quibble about whether Angelos really poses a judicial
dilemma, strictly construed. While there is an interesting theoretical
question about what constitutes judicial dilemma, which we address at
length below, do not let this theoretical question distract from the crucial,
but too often neglected practical question: How, if at all, should judicial
dilemmas be resolved? This practical question arises as long as one thinks
judicial dilemmas arise in systems like ours. It is this practical question
that will be our primary focus in this Article.
There are some responses to this crucial question that we will not
discuss at length, because we think that they are inadequate in important
respects. One such response is to pass the buck by insisting that judges
cannot resolve such dilemmas; only Congress can. We agree that the best
state of affairs would be one in which Congress prevented judicial
dilemmas from arising in the first place via legislative reform. For
43 Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions III, Memorandum For All Federal Prosecutors
on Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017),
http://i2.cdn.tumer.com/cnn/2017/images/05/12/ag.memo.on.department.charging.and.se
ntencing.policy.pdf.
44Id.
Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., Memorandum For All Federal Prosecutors on
Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 19, 2010),
https://www.fd.org/sites/default/files/criminal defense topics/essential topics/sentencing
resources/clemency/holdermemo.pdf.
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instance, Congress could abolish mandatory minimums altogether,
preventing judges like Cassell from facing judicial dilemmas in criminal
sentencing. Although Congress came close last year to reaching an
agreement that would remove or reduce mandatory minimums for many
non-violent offenders, the bipartisan criminal justice reform effort appears
to have stalled in the wake of the recent Presidential election.4 6 Thus, we
assume that Congress, given the current political climate, is unlikely to
remove even the harshest mandatory minimums for the time being. This
leaves judges with the important, unanswered question of what to do in the
interim in response to judicial dilemmas in the criminal context.
Another inadequate response is for judges to opt out of facing
judicial dilemmas by resigning in protest. Some judges have resigned in
ways that can be interpreted this way, and such acts of protest would send
a valuable message that reform is needed.4 7 We raise some concerns about
resignation as a response to judicial dilemmas below. But even if one is
not persuaded by these responses, at the very least we think resignation is
not a generalizable response to judicial dilemmas. If our legal system is to
function at all, let alone function well, some officials must decide cases
like Angelos. So the important question remains: what should those judges
do when confronted with judicial dilemmas?
Our view about how judges should navigate judicial dilemmas in
cases like Angelos is best understood in terms of how it departs from, and
is more satisfying than, the two most obvious remaining responses. One
option is for judges to be "legalists", and just do whatever is legally best-
to obey the law, pure and simple-despite the moral considerations to the
46 Justin George, Can Bipartisan Criminal-Justice Reform Survive in the Trump Era?,
THE NEW YORKER, June 6, 2017, http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/can-
bipartisan-criminal-justice-reform-survive-in-the-trump-era ("Last year, reformers on
both sides agreed to support a proposed [federal] law that would relax mandatory
minimum sentences," but "[t]he bill stalled, then died.... (...) [A]s the contentious
Presidential election neared its conclusion, the alliance started to come undone. (...)
Since President Trump took office, the strain on the coalition has only intensified.").
4 See Nicole Hong, John Gleeson, Prominent Brooklyn Federal Judge, to Step Down,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Jan 4, 2016), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/01/04/john-gleeson-
prominent-brooklyn-federal-judge-to-step-down/.
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contrary. Another option is for judges to just do what is morally best-
which may well involve disobeying the law, perhaps in surreptitious
ways-despite the legal considerations to the contrary. Each of these
options requires the judge to sacrifice a standard that she is deeply
committed to, be it morality or law. In contrast to both of these options,
our view is that judges should seek to satisfice the demands of both
morality and law: that is, to perform actions that are both morally and
legally permissible, even if those actions are somewhat sub-optimal
according to both morality and the law. We dub such responses Satisficing
Options.4 8 Although they may not be the very best alternative either by the
lights of the law or by the lights of morality (i.e. enjoy maximal support
from the moral reasons or the legal reasons), these Satisficing Options
would still be good enough by the lights of both law and morality.
The fundamental problem we address is an instance of the core
question in professional ethics generally: what should officials do when
their general and role-based duties conflict? Some, like Prof. David
Luban, allow that role-based duties must "be balanced against the moral
reasons for breaking the role," and officials should be "willing to
deviate" from their role-based duties when doing so is required by moral
"common sense."49 For others, like Prof Bradley Wendell, the duty to be
faithful to the law must be stronger than officials' duties to do justice in
particular cases, so that the legal system fulfills its fundamental roles of
resolving social disagreements and providing equal treatment of citizens
before the law.5 0 As these arguments illustrate, much of the discussion in
this literature is focused on whether officials (typically lawyers, rather
than judges) should be moralists or legalists; the availability and
assessment of Satisficing Options is neglected.
See infra note 63 (discussing the origins of the tern "satisficing").
49 DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 125 (1988); David Luban,
Misplaced Fidelity, 90 TEXAS L. REV. 673, 688 (2012); See also David Luban, Freedom
and Constraint in Legal Ethics: Some Mid-course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49
MD. L. REV. 424 (1990); see generally ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR
ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE (1999).
50 See BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010).
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We think this is unfortunate. The existing focus, we suggest, is due
largely to a climate in which the natural response to a judicial dilemma
would be to maintain that a judge can 't do anything but apply the law-
often referred to as the "judicial can' t."5 1 We contend that the "judicial
can't" rings hollow as a response to judicial dilemmas. Our basis for this
contention is not the bold claim that the demands of morality are
paramount, as moralists like Robert Cover famously argued in relation to
antebellum judges applying the Fugitive Slave Act;52 rather, we make the
mundane and in many ways more dialectically important complaint that
there is a great deal more that judges can do in addition to "applying" the
law. This reveals the limitation of Wendell's defense of fidelity to law as a
fully general response to judicial dilemmas: if there are Satisficing
Options, judges can do much more to promote justice in particular cases
without violating their arguably stronger official, role-based duties. It is
thus an advantage of our approach that it allows us to defend Satisficing
Options that are morally and legally permissible, and that resolve judicial
dilemmas, without requiring us to settle all debates in legal ethics between
legalism and moralism, Luban, Wendell, Cover, and their many
interlocutors.
Of course, our view would be of little interest if there are no
Satisficing Options. If that were the case, judges would still face a hard
choice between legalism and moralism. That would be a significant blow
to our view. Given this, perhaps the most important task in this Article
will be to explore what Satisficing Options look like in the context of
mandatory minimums. In particular, we will consider five possible
satisficing strategies: interpretative, expressive, assistive, cooperative, and
suggestive strategies. These strategies can be pursued independently or in
tandem. We think they are generally worth exploring, even if they may
ultimately prove unworkable in particular cases.
51 See Scott Shapiro, Judicial Can 't, PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES (2001), (especially at p.
532).
52 ROBERT COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 199-
222 (1975).
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These strategies differ along two dimensions: first and foremost, in
the type of activity that they require of judges, and second, in whether and
how that activity involves interaction with other legal actors (such as the
executive branch, prosecutors, or jurors). The first two strategies can be
implemented by judges acting independently. Interpretative strategies
involve seeking creative and legally permissible, if suboptimal,
interpretations of the law to support more morally attractive legal
outcomes. Expressive strategies involve applying the law while expressing
condemnation of its iniquitous features. The remaining three strategies
involve interaction with other legal actors. Assistive strategies involve
advocacy on behalf of harmed parties to legal agents outside of the court
system, such as calling for the executive to pardon defendants like Mr.
Angelos. Cooperative strategies involve collaborating with other legal
actors within the court system to seek morally acceptable outcomes, and
may require legally permissible but suboptimal acts to create incentives
for actors such as prosecutors to collaborate. Finally, suggestive strategies
involve "nudging" other actors within the legal system-as opposed to
collaborating with them-so that they independently use their discretion to
produce a morally preferable solution of their own accord. For example,
judges might seek out legally permissible, if admittedly suboptimal, means
to prompt juries to consider nullifying the law in cases like Angelos.
We will discuss the extent to which each type of strategy genuinely
counts as a Satisficing Option on its own, or perhaps in tandem with the
other strategies that we listed above. To be clear, we do not defend the
ambitious but implausible view that such Satisficing Options will be
available in every instance of a judicial dilemma. As such, we do not
claim that this Article offers an exhaustive answer to the question of what
judges should do to resolve judicial dilemmas. Perhaps some judges will
be stuck choosing between moralism or legalism; we cannot rule that out.
However, we think that the Satisficing Options we discuss are quite
widely available in a variety of legal contexts, and where they are
available they constitute the judge's best prospect for safely navigating the
risks posed by judicial dilemmas. As such, our view offers significant
progress towards answering our central question.
The order of business will be as follows. In Part I, we provide a
Virginia journal of Criminal Law
precise account of the conceptual structure of the conflict between judges'
moral and legal reasons where mandatory minimums are concerned. We
map out the sources of the obligations at issue and explain how they
interact. We then provide a clearer account of the type of Satisficing
Options we favor, and explain why they constitute a resolution of the
judicial dilemma.
In Part II, we then discuss the five types of strategies just
mentioned, which judges have employed or could employ in response to
judicial dilemmas. We consider each one in relation to criminal cases
involving mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. For example, in
such contexts, the interpretive strategy might involve construing
applicable Constitutional provisions in creative ways to soften the impact
of mandatory minimums, while the cooperative strategy may involve
delaying proceedings in extreme cases to coax prosecutors into dropping
certain excessive criminal charges that carry harsh mandatory minimum
sentences that are out of place in the case at hand. For each of the five
strategies, we discuss the extent to which they actually amount to a
Satisficing Option of the sort we favor. Our hope is that this Part will offer
a partial menu of concrete options for judges to consider when they see a
judicial dilemma on the horizon.
In Part III, we consider the biggest source of opposition to our
advocacy of Satisficing Options: that they constitute, or risk, intolerable
erosions of the rule of law. We agree that protecting rule of law values is
of great moral importance. As such, strategies which are morally
preferable along some other dimension (for instance, by promoting justice
to particular defendants) might ultimately be morally impermissible if they
constitute a sufficiently serious violation of the rule of law. However, we
contend that this does not rule out at least some of the strategies that we
consider, because (a) our advocacy of these strategies can be restricted in
simple ways that significantly attenuate concerns about the erosion of rule
of law values, and (b) in some contexts, the strategies that we advocate on
balance promote rule of law values.
Finally, the Conclusion briefly draws out some lessons from the
foregoing discussion of the various strategies judges might adopt in the
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face of judicial dilemmas involving mandatory minimums. Our contention
is that while there may be no silver bullet for resolving any and every
judicial dilemma that arises, adopting a combination of some of the above
strategies would go a long way toward mitigating the injustice of
mandatory minimums while allowing judges to sufficiently comply with
both their moral responsibilities and their legal duties. Rather than making
legal sacrifices to attain moral perfection or making moral sacrifices to
attain perfection in the eyes of the law, we submit that judges facing
judicial dilemmas should chart a middle course: Seek out options that are
at least sufficiently good by the lights of both morality and law. Perfection
is the enemy of the good, as the old saying goes. This is true not only for
statesmen and craftsmen, but also for judges facing judicial dilemmas.
I. THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF JUDICIAL DILEMMAS
To ground and clarify the subsequent discussion, it will help to
proceed with an account of the conceptual structure of judicial dilemmas
and a corresponding account of what it takes to resolve a judicial dilemma.
We will provide accounts of each in this section. Section A offers a rough
sketch of the conceptual structure of judicial dilemmas and our favored
approach to resolving them, while Section B refines this account and
Section C considers crucial theoretical questions about the framing device
we use to explain how judicial dilemmas operate. Finally, Section D
provides an overview of the strategies for resolving judicial dilemmas we
will explore in depth.
A. A SIMPLE MODEL OF JUDICIAL DILEMMAS AND HOW To RESOLVE
THEM
Any passably precise account of such topics will inevitably have to
draw on framing devices that will be somewhat controversial; but most of
the framing devices we employ here are not ones we are especially firmly
wedded to, so we should not be distracted by such controversies. Our
subsequent arguments can be easily translated into other analytical
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frameworks, or subject to different interpretations, and we are happy to
adopt a different conceptual structure should it prove more advantageous.
Our central framing device, then, will be the notion of a reason: a
consideration that counts in favor of an action.5 3 We will also appeal to the
now familiar distinction between moral and legal reasons.54 We will not
offer an account of this distinction as we wish to be ecumenical, but some
illustrative examples can be used to glom onto these intuitive notions. That
a child is starving overseas is a moral reason to give to charity, but not a
legal reason to give to charity; the law is silent on private philanthropy. By
contrast, there are strong legal reasons not to open someone else's mail
(doing so can be a felony)55 even if the letter is clearly just an unwanted ad
and opening it would be morally innocuous (or at least trifling). Moral and
56legal reasons thus come apart.
If moral and legal reasons come apart, it is at least conceptually
possible that one can face decisions where what is morally best (i.e. most
53 See, e.g., DEREK PARFIT, ON WHAT MATTERS: VOLUME ONE 1 (2011) ("Facts give us
reasons when they count in favour of our having some belief or desire, or acting in some
way. When our reasons to do something are stronger than our reasons to do anything else,
this act is what we have most reason to do, and may be what we should, ought or must
do.") (emphasis omitted); THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998).
For an extensive discussion of the role legal reasons can play in understanding other
legal notions such as precedent, see John Horty, Rules and Reasons in the Theory of
Precedent, 17 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2011); JOHN HORTY, REASONS AS DEFAULTS (2012).
For more general discussion of 'legal reasons', and how they may differ from 'moral
reasons', see Scott Shapiro, What is the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1157, 1161-63 (2006), and SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 184-88 (2011). But see David
Enoch, Reason-Giving and the Law, in OXFORD STUDIES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1,
17, n. 28 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011) (arguing that there is nothing special
about legal reasons); and cf Scott Hershovitz, The End ofJurisprudence, 124 YALE L. J.
1160, 1194 n. 55 (2016).
18 U.S.C. § 1702 (defining the crime of "obstruction of correspondence").
56 We take this position to be intuitive, but not entirely uncontroversial. To say that moral
and legal reasons come apart is to take a stand against the view that legal reasons just are
moral reasons one has because of the law. (The latter is the analog of Greenberg's view
about legal duties. See generally Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory ofLaw, 123
YALE L. J. 1288 (2014).)
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supported by the moral reasons) and what is legally best (i.e. most
supported by the legal reasons) come apart by non-negligible margins.
When judges face such decisions in determining whether to obey or
disobey the law, they face a judicial dilemma.
We can make this more precise in two stages: the first clarifies the
structure of a judicial dilemma and the second elucidates what it is to
resolve a dilemma. To begin with, then, we can represent the two most
obvious actions that a judge might take in cases like Angelos. Some
scholars-the moralists-argue that judges should engage in disobedience
in such cases. This is what Jeffrey Brand-Ballard calls "lawless judging":
it can involve willfully misinterpreting and misapplying unambiguous
laws to reach morally preferable outcomes (perhaps only in the view of the
judge). * In claiming that judges should sometimes engage in
disobedience, moralists in effect argue that judges should do what is
morally best even if it is legally worst. In the terminology we adopt, this
option can be labeled disobedience. Other writers-the legalists-might
advocate for what we will call pure obedience. J.D. Mabbott, for instance,
famously argued that punishment is a "purely legal issue," such that
judges should simply apply the law when punishing any particular
defendant, and that's it. Judges ought to do so because it is legally best,
regardless of the moral reasons at play.
For the sake of the argument, let us grant the moralist that
disobedience is morally best, and let us grant the legalist that pure
obedience is legally best. Now we can represent (a simplified instance of)
the structure of a judicial dilemma by representing how these options are
evaluated according to moral and legal reasons on a scale of 0 (worst) to
10 (best):
DISOBEDIENCE PURE OBEDIENCE
MORAL REASONS 10 0
LEGAL REASONS 0 10
5 JEFFREY BRAND-BALLARD, LIMITS OF LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING
(2010).
5 J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, 48 MIND 152, 152-54 (1939).
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If a judge faced a decision with this structure, we think that there is
an intuitive sense in which neither the moralist nor the legalist offers a
satisfactory way to resolve the dilemma. Indeed, if a judge is forced to
choose between these options, her position is tragic: she is doomed to
score terribly according to one standard that she is deeply committed to:
morality or law.
Of course, judges rarely if ever face decisions quite like the one
above. This representation of a judicial dilemma is too simple in two main
respects. First, there are more (moral and legal) reasons at play than the
simple table above suggests. In particular, morality is obviously not
wholly opposed to pure obedience, and-less obviously-the law is not
wholly opposed to some disobedience. Thus, on the one hand, there are
plenty of familiar moral reasons for judges to apply the law, which may
even give judges a prima facie moral duty to apply the law (even when it
is somewhat unjust). 5 9 On the other hand, philosophers such as Brand-
Ballard have emphasized that there are legal considerations that at least
can militate in favor of some disobedience, such as the judicial oath to do
60justice. Moreover, a judge might face a conflict between different
provisions of law. For instance, the judge might be convinced that a
particular statute is unconstitutional, even though a higher court might
have disagreed. This is another way in which one might contend that the
judge believes there are legal reasons in favor of disobedience.6 1 In light
of this, a more accurate representation of actual judicial dilemmas might
be this:
5 M.B.E. Smith, Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?, 82 YALE L. J. 950
(1973).
60 BRAND-BALLARD, supra note 57; Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Limits ofJudicial Fidelity
to Law: The Coxford Lecture, 24 CANADIAN J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 305 (2011).
61 Of course, the law judicial system provides a safe outlet in such cases: namely, the
option for the judge to write a dissenting opinion rather than engage in outright
disobedience of the higher court's ruling.
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DISOBEDIENCE PURE OBEDIENCE
MORAL REASONS 10 4
LEGAL REASONS 2 10
Notably, even in such messier decision contexts, it is still the case that one
option is morally best but legally worst, and vice versa. So this
complication makes the picture of a judicial dilemma more accurate, but
not less concerning: moralistic views still demand that judges perform acts
that are worst according to legal reasons, and mutatis mutandis for
legalistic views and moral reasons. Neither choice resolves the dilemma.
The second way in which the above tables are too simple is that
there often are more options available than doing what is morally best or
what is legally best. For instance, instead of obeying or disobeying the
law, judges can simply resign at an earlier point in time. This is frequently
recognized, but widely disparaged: it does not resolve the dilemma,
because it just avoids the dilemma. To illustrate this, consider a putative
instance of a moral dilemma: a young Frenchman during World War II
might have to choose between staying at home to help his ailing mother
and leaving home to join the frontlines of the French Resistance.6 2 The
Frenchman could avoid (rather than resolve) this dilemma by choosing to
do neither: he could commit suicide. Judicial resignation is in some ways
not unlike suicide. The judge faces a hard choice between two options
that are supported by different reasons. Resignation just allows the judge
to opt out of the system and avoid that hard choice. (There are also moral
reasons that militate against resignation: it depletes the pool of
conscientious and competent judges, for example.) We will ignore
resignation in what follows, as we want to consider options that resolve
judicial dilemmas.
This takes us to the second stage of our framework: conceptually,
what is it to resolve a judicial dilemma? A central contention in what
follows will be that there are options-alternatives to disobedience, pure
obedience, and resignation-that resolve judicial dilemmas. What does
62 JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM AND HUMAN EMOTIONS 24-26 (1957).
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that mean?
Think of moral dilemmas once more. Imagine that the young
Frenchman had a third option: he could live in a house on the outskirts of
his village where he could (a) support the resistance to a slightly lesser
degree by, say, secretly printing pamphlets and (b) frequently check in on
his ailing mother. This is not as good for the Resistance, or as good for his
mother. But plausibly, it is good enough for both: it satisfices with respect
to both types of demands but does not maximize either.63 This, we claim,
would resolve his moral dilemma.
Likewise, we think that if there is an option that satisfices the
judge's moral and legal reasons, 64 it would resolve the judicial dilemma
even if that option is neither morally nor legally optimal. Such an option
need not be best by the lights of morality or law, but it is good enough by
the lights of both.
Indeed, there might be several such options in a given case. After
all, we might think most real-life cases present a range of options on the
continuum between pure legal obedience and pure disobedience.
Typically, there will be a range of actions judges can take where some
conflict less flagrantly with the law than others. For instance, a decision
that flatly contradicts the text of a statute might be far towards the pure
disobedience end of the spectrum, while stretching a statutory term
beyond what might seem natural may still amount to disobeying the law,
63 H.A. Simon, Rational Choice and the Structure of the Environment, 63 PSYCH. REV.
129, 136 (1956) (introducing, for the first time, the notion of satisficing). The term is also
widely used in the philosophical literature on consequentialism. See, e.g., Michael Slote
& Philip Pettit, Satisficing Consequentialism, 58 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN
SOCIETY 139 (1984); Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Consequentialism, STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2015) (discussing arguments for and against satisficing
consequentialism). Our view does not rely in any way on the truth of satisficing
consequentialism. We merely draw inspiration from the very basic concept underlying
these theories.
64 Our talk of an action's "satisficing the judge's moral and legal reasons" is shorthand
for an action that exemplifies the satisficing strategy with respect to the applicable moral
and legal reasons (or standards)-i.e. is an action that is sufficiently (if not optimally)
good with respect to the relevant kinds of reasons (or standards).
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but in a less flagrant way that lies closer to the obedience end of the
spectrum. Thus, a more realistic picture of a judicial dilemma might be
this:
PURE SATISFICING SATISFICING PURE
DISOBEDIENCE A B OBEDIENCE
MORAL 10 8 7 4
REASONS
LEGAL 2 7 9 10
REASONS
We take it to be intuitive that if there are Satisficing Options, then
there is an important sense in which judges ought to take them.65
Crucially, we do not claim that judges ought to take this option because
they must maximize the satisfaction of moral and legal reasons. This view
that one ought to "maximize all reasons" might be one possible view that
some might endorse, but we do not. In other words, we do not defend
Satisficing Option B in the table above because its total score (16) is
greater than the total for Satisficing Option A (15), or Pure Disobedience
(12) or Pure Obedience (14). To defend such a claim, we would have to
supply some account of how we can meaningfully compare and aggregate
moral and legal reasons on a single scale, and we are not confident that
such comparisons can be meaningfully made.66 Rather, our claim is that
judges ought to take such options because they are good enough by the
lights of both relevant normative standards that judges ought to take
seriously in judicial deliberations. This only requires that we make
65 One might ask: in what sense of "ought"? Morally, the judge ought to engage in
disobedience and legally the judge ought to engage in pure obedience (ex hypothesi). One
way to resolve this issue that we are attracted is to claim that the answer is: rationally the
judge ought to take a Satisficing Option. We think this answer is plausible so long as we
have a specific sense of rationality in mind. See, e.g., Amelia Hicks, Moral Uncertainty
and Value Comparison, 13 OXFORD STUDIES INMETAETHICS (forthcoming) (2018).
66 Ruth Chang, Value Incomparability and Incommensurability, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF VALUE THEORY 1, 5 (Iwao Hirose and Jonas Olson, eds., 2015).
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meaningful comparisons between moral reasons and moral reasons, and
between legal reasons and legal reasons; it does not require comparisons
between moral and legal reasons. Accordingly, one important motivation
for focusing on Satisficing Options as a distinct approach to resolving
judicial dilemmas is that one can identify them without needing to
compare, aggregate or trade off moral and legal reasons against each
other. Satisficing Options can be identified even if moral and legal reasons
are not strictly commensurable: all one needs to do is to ask which actions
sufficiently meet the demands of the law, considered alone, and
sufficiently meet the demands of morality, considered alone.
Thus, our view is that if both Satisficing Options A and B in the
above table are good enough by the lights of the law and good enough by
the lights of morality, then either Satisficing Option A or Satisficing
Option B could be a defensible way to resolve the judge's dilemma. That
is, assuming either one would pass muster under both of the applicable
normative standards the judge is committed to (perhaps both law and
morality required at least a score of 7 to be at least defensible), then either
one could be adopted by a reasonable person-even if reasonable minds
might differ as to whether Satisficing Option A or Satisficing Option B is
the strictly the best resolution to the dilemma. Accordingly, our view is
quite minimal: we claim only that ifthere are Satisficing Options (i.e. ones
that fare sufficiently well both by the lights of the law and by the lights of
morality), then judges ought to take one of them. Further than this we will
not venture here.
B. REFINING THE MODEL
Even this more sophisticated model of Satisficing Options is still
too simple in crucial ways. The above tables misleadingly suggest that a
judge encounters judicial dilemmas as isolated decision-points in which
she considers a range of options simultaneously and determines which, if
any, amounts to a Satisficing Option. Thus, to complete our account, note
that in reality, a judge's role in any given case is temporally extended: she
faces a series of complex choices wherein what is morally best may depart
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from what is legally best. The interaction between these choices is often
significant. A determination of the admissibility of crucial evidence at ti
can significantly alter the legal options available to the jury in determining
whether to convict at t2 and thus how the judge may sentence at t3 . Given
this, it would be more accurate to say that the appropriate targets of
assessment in judicial ethics should not be limited to individual choices at
particular points in time, but should also include sequences of such
choices over time. In short, the relevant options display a diachronic
structure.67
Thus, one particular judicial action might not qualify as a
Satisficing Option in isolation, but it could still figure into a defensible
package deal that together amounts to a Satisficing Option. Indeed, one
core component of such a satisficing package might be doing something
that is legally and morally permissible, but sub-optimal, in order to avoid
having to face a deeper conflict between morality and law at a later point
in time; a somewhat loose way of describing such actions would be that
they alleviate or preclude judicial dilemmas before they arise. In addition
to seeking to resolve judicial dilemmas after they arise, the underlying
interests and values at stake can give judges reason to seek to minimize
the risk of encountering judicial dilemmas in the future. This is, of course,
particularly pressing where judges have reason to anticipate the emergence
of judicial dilemmas in discrete contexts (say, in a particular class of
immigration cases, or with respect to sentencing or guilty pleas). As a
result, a package of steps that together comprise a Satisficing Option need
not involve only expost steps to extricate oneself from an existing judicial
dilemma, but can also incorporate ex ante steps to block such dilemmas
from arising downstream.
Accordingly, the structure of Satisficing Options might end up
being quite complex in practice, and nothing we say below is meant to
diminish this complexity. In the next Part, we will present a range of
possible strategies aimed at resolving judicial dilemmas, and we will
discuss the extent to which they might or might not amount to Satisficing
67 This point is familiar from work on deontic logic. See, e.g., FRED FELDMAN, DOING
THE BEST WE CAN: AN ESSAY IN INFORMAL DEONTIC LOGIC (1986).
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Options on their own, while also considering the ways in which some of
them might be combined to make up a temporally extended sequence that
constitutes a Satisficing Option.
In taking the view that if there are Satisficing Options, judges
ought to take them, we do not also commit ourselves to the contentious
claim that there will always be Satisficing Options. In the next Part, we
will defend the view that there are often such options. Our strategy will be
to focus on criminal contexts and identify courses of action that satisfice
the moral and legal demands on judges, and then note that these strategies
generalize to many other legal contexts. It could be argued that some of
these courses of action are not genuine Satisficing Options. And it could
be argued that some of the Satisficing Options also do not generalize to
other legal contexts. We are open to such views about the details of our
approach, as we are decidedly not trying to establish that all judicial
dilemmas will be resolvable. Rather, we grant that some judicial dilemmas
may well remain irresolvable despite all we say, in which case there
remains a further question-which we do not attempt to answer in this
article-about whether judges should prioritize morality or law.
C. DEFENDING THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF THE MODEL
Having offered this account of the conceptual structure of judicial
dilemmas, and of resolving judicial dilemmas, we can now say more about
our choices with respect to the framing device of conflicting moral and
legal reasons. Why have we appealed to moral and legal reasons rather
than duties? Appealing to duties would perhaps be a more traditional
framing device, and if one likes, one can translate our talk of reasons into
talk of duties by appealing to, say, Joseph Raz's famous analysis of duties
in terms of reasons.68 Nonetheless, we think that appealing to reasons
allows for a more fine-grained analysis in at least four respects.
First, there are plausible sources of moral reasons that are not
68 JOSEPH RAz, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 76 (1975) (arguing that moral duties can
be understood as exclusionary reasons).
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plausible sources of moral duties. For instance, judges plausibly have
moral reasons to maintain their own integrity, even though it is
contentious that one can owe moral duties to oneself Or perhaps judges
have reasons to take some steps at some point to avoid judicial dilemmas
(or reduce the frequency), even if they do not have a duty to do so on any
particular occasion.
Second, there are also plausible instances in which judges can fail
to do what they have most legal reason to do without violating any legal
duties. For instance, Hart argued that judges have "interstitial discretion"
in interpreting ambiguous sources of law,70 and this might permit them to
adopt a morally preferable interpretation even when other interpretations
are better supported by legal reasons. Thus, adopting the best moral
interpretation might be only legally second-best, but still perhaps not
legally impermissible. Such a scenario is easier to capture by talking in
terms of reasons, as opposed to duties.
Third, appealing to legal reasons renders it easier to make a
detailed comparison between a wide array of alternatives. For instance, it
may well be that most of the moral reasons that favor pure obedience (but
not pure disobedience) also favor Satisficing Options, and most of the
moral reasons that favor pure disobedience (but not pure obedience) also
favor Satisficing Options. This would be much harder to represent clearly
using talk of duties. Hence our talk of reasons instead.
Finally, for any view about what judges should do regarding
conflicts between morality and law, there will be epistemic questions
about when they do and do not have sufficient access to moral and legal
status of different decisions. We will not present a full answer to that issue
69 See, e.g., Kurt Baier, Moral Obligation, 3 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 224,
225 n. 27 (arguing against the notion of self-regarding duties); Dennis Anthony Rohatyn,
Self-Regarding Duties Again, 5 CRITICA 117 (1971) (responding to Baier's argument and
defending the idea of self-regarding duties).
70 H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 124-47 (1994) (arguing that judges have discretion to
fill in gaps left by vague laws with an open texture); see also id. at 259 (summarizing
Hart's view that "courts exercise a genuine though interstitial law-making power or
discretion in those cases where the existing explicit law fails to dictate a decision").
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here since it is a difficulty all theorists face equally. But our framework in
terms of reasons rather than duties may help here since there is
considerable work on this issue that proceeds in terms of reasons
(particularly, what it takes for an agent to have or possess a reason).71
Within our framework, we can appeal to well-developed general answers
to these hard questions about epistemic access; frameworks that proceed in
terms of duties do not have this advantage. We will not dwell on this
advantage, however. As noted, questions about judges' epistemic access to
what morality and the law require are a challenge on all views.
Some might further object to our framing the discussion in terms
of legal versus moral reasons. There is, after all, a range of theories, or
interpretations, of the nature of moral and legal reasons. For instance,
some influential theorists like Professors Mark Greenberg and Scott
Hershovitz contend that legal reasons are simply one type of moral
reasons.72 So are we in trouble for distinguishing between moral and legal
reasons?
We think not. Our account of Satisficing Options and the
discussion below of different approaches to judicial dilemmas in the
sentencing context can straightforwardly be translated into one's preferred
view about the nature of legal and moral reasons. Thus, if one thinks that
legal reasons are simply a species of moral reasons, there would be no
difficulty in recasting our concerns entirely within the domain of morality
(i.e. between two groups of moral reasons), rather than as a conflict
between morality and law. If our concerns are recast in any such way, a
conflict between some categories of reasons will remain. Some might still
worry that this would make the motivation behind satisficing solutions to
71 See, inter alia, Mark Schroeder, Having Reasons, 139 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 57
(2008); Mark Schroeder, What Does it Take to 'Have' a Reason?, in REASONS FOR
BELIEF (Andrew Reisner & Anglich Setglich-Petersen eds., 2011); Errol Lord, Having
Reasons and the Factoring Account, 149 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 238 (2010), and The
Coherent and the Rational, 55 ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 151 (2014), and Daniel Whiting,
Keep Things in Perspective: Reasons, Rationality, and the A Priori, 8, JOURNAL OF
ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (2014).
72 See footnotes 49 and 51 above and surrounding text.
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such conflicts dissipate, but we are not convinced that this is the case. If
we take seriously that there are different types of moral reasons, it is far
from clear that they are easily commensurable, such that it is appropriate
to always aim to maximize the aggregate of all the applicable reasons. Our
focus on Satisficing Options is motivated in part by the desire to figure out
how to approach and resolve judicial dilemmas without needing the
relevant groups of reasons to be strictly commensurable or capable of
aggregation. As a result, we think that both the underlying conflict and the
motivations behind Satisficing Options remain intact if one interprets
judicial dilemmas in a different way than we do or adopts some other view
on the nature of legal and moral reasons than the one we used in framing
our account above. This is, we think, to be expected: little of substance
should hang on one's choices over dispensable framing devices.
D. PREVIEWING THE MENU OF SATISFICING OPTIONS
Let us turn, now, to Satisficing Options themselves. In what
follows, we will discuss the relative merits of five kinds of Satisficing
Options that we think can resolve judicial dilemmas. We do not take a
stand on which of these options is best, all things considered. We think
many of them are compatible, and indeed complimentary, rather than
competing. Moreover, we do not take ourselves to bear the burden of
establishing that each and every one of the strategies we discuss
constitutes a genuine Satisficing Option: we aim to show that some such
options exist by charting some theoretically neglected terrain. Before we
discuss the details of each strategy and whether it constitutes a genuine
Satisficing Option, let us outline them up front for the sake of clarity.
The first two involve strategies that judges can successfully
implement on their own, without the aid of other actors. First, we will
discuss interpretive strategies. Under this approach, the judge seeks to
resolve the dilemma by putting in effort and creativity to seek an
interpretation of the applicable legal materials that would be more morally
attractive than the Pure Obedience option (i.e. applying the simplest, most
legally uncontroversial interpretation, which might be less than morally
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ideal). Second, we will consider expressive strategies. This approach
combines Pure Obedience with actions that express the judge's moral
disapproval of the applicable legal regime.
The next three strategies involve the judiciary interacting in
different ways with different legal actors. Thus, the third option we will
discuss covers assistive strategies. This approach also combines Pure
Obedience with further actions-in this case, actions by the judge that are
aimed at assisting or advocating on behalf of the defendants appearing
before the court (or on behalf of other parties who are directly impacted by
the judge's decisions). This strategy focuses on seeking assistance for
defendants or other impacted parties from legal actors outside the court
system: primarily, the executive.
Fourth, we will look at cooperative strategies. These strategies
attempt to engage with legal actors within the court system to cooperate in
finding a morally preferable solution to the case at hand that nonetheless
are legally permissible. Most obviously, a sentencing judge seeking
cooperation from the prosecutor to impose a lesser sentence would be one
example; for this strategy to succeed, the judge and prosecutor need to
cooperate, or act in concert. In this context we also discuss ways in which
judges can offer carrots and sticks to other legal actors, especially
prosecutors, to ensure that they are willing to cooperate and collaborate in
finding a legally and morally satisfactory outcome.
Finally, we will look at suggestive strategies. This ambitious
strategy also involves interacting with legal actors within the court system
to use their discretion to produce a morally preferable solution. However,
cooperative and suggestive strategies differ because the latter do not
require other agents to act in concert with judges. Juries, for instance, may
nullify the law of their own accord-this is not a cooperative venture. For
judges to suggestively prompt juries to nullify the law would be an
illustrative instance of the suggestive strategy. This way of suggesting or
nudging other legal actors is likely to be legally dubious or controversial at
times, but nonetheless might qualify as a permissible Satisficing Option if
it is pursued in the right way. We will discuss how a judge might walk this
tightrope in particular practical contexts.
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As it will become clear, many of the strategies we consider are
aimed at combining a strict application of the law (Pure Obedience) with
other actions-whether extra-judicial or within the adjudicatory context-
that aim to promote justice in a broad sense. Other strategies we discuss
involve using the flexibility that legal doctrine itself provides as a way to
pursue morally just outcomes.
We acknowledge that a natural concern with this project is that
judges in principle could go too far in pursuit of morality as they see it.
There are tremendous benefits to civil society in terms of fairness and
stability that stem from the courts' powerful commitment to the rule of
law. One might wonder whether our project is in tension with rule of law
values.
We are mindful of this risk, to be sure. But we think it is still
worthwhile to inquire into how far judges might go to combat clear
injustices caused by laws that there is not the political will to remove
without substantially undermining the rule of law. Thus, our project takes
for granted a judicial climate like ours with a vigorous commitment to rule
of law values. We think that the norms of judicial ethics that are widely
endorsed in the U.S.73 serve as a powerful counterbalance to the risk to the
rule of law that, in other systems, might be posed by judges seeking to
comply with morality as they perceive it. Against the backdrop of
widespread commitment by judges to rule of law values, however, there is
utility in asking what Satisficing Options might be available to help judges
adequately comply both with their legal and moral reasons when faced
with a judicial dilemma. In other less rigorous judicial climates with a
substantially weaker commitment to the rule of law, we would not
necessarily endorse some of the strategies for resolving judicial dilemmas
73 See, e.g., UNITED STATES COURTS, CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES,
Canon 2(A), http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/code-conduct-united-states-
judges#b ("Respect for Law. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.").
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'74discussed in this paper (perhaps especially the bolder ones). But we are
not in such a judicial climate. Thus, we intend our discussion of
Satisficing Options to be confined to systems like ours where a strong
commitment to the rule of law can be taken for granted. With this caveat,
let us begin to consider the strategies judges might reasonably employ in
order to resolve judicial dilemmas.
II. STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE JUDICIAL DILEMMAS
A. INTERPRETATIVE STRATEGIES
When faced with dilemmas between the applicable moral and legal
reasons, the most natural strategy a judge might take to resolve it is to seek
out a plausible interpretation of the law in the case at hand that would also
be acceptable by the lights of morality. We call this the interpretive
strategy. Under this approach, the judge seeks to resolve her dilemma by
exerting effort and creativity to find an interpretation of the relevant legal
materials that is more morally attractive than Pure Obedience. "Pure
Obedience" here refers to the least legally controversial interpretation of
the legal materials (i.e. the resolution that is best supported by the legal
reasons), which is assumed to be morally problematic (i.e. is disfavored by
the moral reasons). The interpretive strategy recommends searching for a
legally available interpretation of the law that would yield outcomes that
are significantly more morally attractive than Pure Obedience.
To illustrate how the interpretive strategy operates in practice,
we'll consider in detail how it can be used in one of our core instances of
7 Indeed, note that where the rule of law concerns are paramount and decisively
outweigh all other moral considerations, one might think there would no longer be any
judicial dilemma to resolve-even if the judge believes she is faced with a somewhat
unjust law. We defined a judicial dilemma as a case faced by a judge where what is most
supported by the moral reasons comes apart from what is legally best. If rule of law
considerations are decisive, however, then there would arguably be no divergence
between what is morally and legally best. The morally best thing to do would just be to
follow the best legal course of action (i.e. Pure Obedience).
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the judge's dilemma. In the Introduction, we saw the judge's dilemma
squarely presented in cases involving the troublingly harsh mandatory
minimum sentences that are demanded by federal criminal law. To resolve
this dilemma, judges might apply the interpretive strategy to seek out ways
to avoid imposing the relevant mandatory minimums. Toward this end,
they might entertain bold legal theories that provide the grounds for
striking down the applicable mandatory minimum sentencing provisions
as unconstitutional.
We will discuss the prospects for two common constitutional
challenges to mandatory minimums of the sort that were involved in
Angelos. First, some argue that such mandatory minimums violate the
Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment. Second, others
argue that some mandatory minimum provisions are void for vagueness.
These two challenges are useful for our purposes because they
demonstrate where the line goes between legally unavailable
interpretations that judges cannot adopt and the sort of Satisficing Option
that we think judges should adopt. On the one hand, while striking down
the provision at issue in Angelos under the Eighth Amendment might
produce a morally desirable outcome, it is too legally tenuous to count as a
genuine Satisficing Option. It is not sufficient by the lights of the law.
On the other hand, the vagueness challenge to the provision in
Angelos has more going for it in light of the recent Supreme Court
decision in United States v. Johnson, which invalidated a related provision
as unconstitutionally vague. In fact, there is a Circuit split about whether
Johnson carries over to cases like Angelos and requires invalidating
provisions like the one at issue there as well. Even if the optimal legal
interpretation would recommend against carrying Johnson over to strike
down the provision in Angelos, the Circuit split shows that there at least
are some strong legal grounds for doing so. There is a close call on the
legal question of whether Johnson carries over to Angelos, and so there
would be adequate legal support for Judge Cassell to strike down the
provision in Angelos as void for vagueness. Since this option is
7 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015).
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significantly better by the lights of morality, and is also supported by
strong legal arguments, this would amount to a Satisficing Option that we
think judges generally should take. Accordingly, we think that Judge
Cassell, if faced with a legally close call like this, should advert to the
decisive moral reasons in favor of accepting a reasonable, and legally
permissible, interpretation of the law that prevents him from having to
impose the unjust mandatory minimum. We think this conclusion is, in
fact, quite ecumenical in jurisprudence.7 6
So as to not lose sight of the forest for the trees, let us emphasize
what we are using the difference between these two constitutional
challenges to illustrate. There may well be morally preferable
interpretations (such as declaring that mandatory minimums violate the
Eighth Amendment) that are legally impermissible because they are ruled
out by binding, unambiguous precedential decisions or other sources of
law; these are not Satisficing Options, on our view. These should not be
conflated with morally preferable interpretations (such as declaring
specific provisions of mandatory minimums to be void for vagueness) that
may be legally sub-optimal, but are still legally permissible all the same;
these are Satisficing Options, on our view.
We hope that the discussion of two specific constitutional
76 So described, our position here might be read to rest on a significant assumption about
the concept of law. Namely, it may be read to assume a form of legal positivism (such as
H.L.A. HART, CONCEPT OF LAW 185-86), and reject a form of anti-positivism (especially
that of RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 27-43 (1986)). We do not think, however, that
our position rests on any such assumption about the concept of law. Legal anti-positivists
allow that in some rare cases judges should disobey the law (see RONALD DWORKIN,
JUSTICE IN ROBES 18-19 (2006)). And more pertinently, anti-positivist views struggle to
entirely remove legal indeterminacy (and hence some degree of judicial discretion
between rival interpretations), for reasons that have been discussed at length by others
(see TIMOTHY ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 167 (2000)). Besides, as many have noted,
Dworkin's views about constitutional interpretation rest on implausible assumptions
about the role of original intent and the ability of judges: see, e.g., Connie Rosati, The
Moral Reading of Constitutions, in THE LEGACY OF RONALD DWORKIN 327-37 (Wil
Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa eds., 2016). The latter assumption is telling in this context;
even if there is a determinate answer to what the law is, plausibly the difficulty of
knowing it makes a variety of interpretations legally permissible.
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approaches helps to illuminate the space for legally permissible but sub-
optimal interpretations. But in case it helps, considering a literary analogy
may serve to illustrate and motivate the difference we have in mind.
Between three possible interpretations of King Lear, it is possible that the
first is ruled out by unambiguous features of the text itself, but the second
is not, even though the third fits the text slightly better than the second. If
this were the case, the second interpretation would be permissible (unlike
the first), even though it is not optimal (like the third). As an
interpretation, it would satisfice. Like in the literary case, we think there
are legal interpretations that satisfice the demands of the law: they fit the
sources well enough to be permissible even if they do not fit them as well
as other interpretations. So long as you accept that, and you accept that
some satisficing interpretations can be morally superior, you should accept
that there can be interpretative Satisficing Options.
1. Cruel and Unusual
As seen above, although Judge Cassell found Mr. Angelos' 55-
year sentence to be disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense, he
determined that this punishment was not cruel and unusual in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. Could Judge Cassell have reached a different
conclusion with regard to this challenge to the constitutionality of Mr.
Angelos' sentence?
As the Supreme Court recently stated, it "has struggled with
whether and how to apply the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause to
sentences for noncapital crimes." 79 There is significant precedent,
7 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1257-59.
7 An Amicus Brief signed by 163 individuals-including former United States District
and Circuit Judges, former United States Attorneys, and four former Attorneys General of
the United States-argued that Mr. Angelos' sentence constituted "cruel and unusual
punishment" in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Amici Curiae Brief at 1-2,
United States v. Angelos, 433 F.3d 738 (10th Cir. 2006) (No. 04-4282), 2005 WL
2347343.
7 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 86 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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however, for the position that the Eighth Amendment prohibits terms of
incarceration that are grossly disproportionate to the offense charged: in
Solem v. Helm, the Supreme Court declared that the imposition of a
mandatory term of life imprisonment under a state recidivist statute
constituted cruel and unusual punishment.80 The Court outlined a three-
step test to determine whether a non-capital punishment is grossly
disproportionate to the offense, which involves considering "(i) the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed
on the other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."81
As the Supreme Court has noted, it has "not established a clear or
consistent path for courts to follow in applying the highly deferential
narrow proportionality analysis." 8 2 But lower courts have largely followed
the Supreme Court's highly deferential approach, expressing clear
unwillingness to invalidate state sentencing practices. 8 3 Following the lead
of the Supreme Court, challenges to severe mandatory minimum sentences
on Eighth Amendment grounds are rarely raised, and almost never
so Solem v. Helm 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See also Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31
(2003) (upholding sentence under three strikes law but applying 8 th Amendment
proportionality analysis); O'Neil v. Vermont 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J.
dissenting); Weems v. United States 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910).
81 Solem, 63 U.S. at 292.
82 Graham, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036-37(2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). See also Lockyer
v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003) (noting that with regard to the grossly
disproportionate test, the Supreme Court has "not established a clear or consistent path
for the courts to follow" and "precedents in this area have not been a model of clarity").
83 See, e.g., United States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v.
MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 247--48 (3d Cir. 2006); Alford v. Rolfs, 867 F.2d 1216, 1222
(9th Cir. 1989); Adaway v. State, 902 So. 2d 746, 750 (Fla. 2005); State v. Harris, 844
S.W.2d 601, 602 (Tenn. 1992).
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succeed. 8 4
This, in fact, is why Judge Cassell determined that he was bound
by precedent to conclude that Mr. Angelos' sentence did not violate the
Eighth Amendment.8 5  In Harmelin v. Michigan, the Supreme Court
upheld the defendant's sentence of life in prison without parole for
possessing 672 grams of cocaine, as required by a Michigan statute.86
Suppose now that Judge Cassell wanted to adopt the interpretive
strategy for resolving the apparent dilemma between his moral and legal
reasons. One move he might make is to try to distinguish Angelos from
Harmelin. Thus, perhaps Judge Cassell could have argued that Angelos
involved federal sentencing practices, while Harmelin challenged a state
sentencing regime.
Why might this matter? Because of federalism. The Supreme Court
to this point has dealt with Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual"
challenges primarily as against state sentencing laws, but some theorists
argue that federalism demands that courts show greater deference to state
legislation than to federal legislation.87 Thus, a federal sentencing statute
might face a steeper uphill battle when challenged under the Eighth
See Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Cruel and Unusual Federal Punishments, 98
IOWA L. REV. 69, 87 n. 116 (2012) ("it is telling as well that some defendants sentenced
to extraordinarily long prison terms in federal court do not even bother to challenge their
sentences on Eighth Amendment grounds. See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 293 F. App'x
700, 702-03 (11th Cir. 2008) (defendant sentenced to 182 years imprisonment on
seventeen gun- and narcotic-related counts did not raise an Eighth Amendment
challenge).
Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1259-60.
86 Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991).
See Mannheimer, supra note 84 at 69 ("the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on cruel
and unusual carceral punishments is extraordinarily deferential to legislative judgments
about how harsh prison sentences ought to be for particular crimes. This deferential
approach stems largely from concerns of federalism, for all of the Court's modern cases
on the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause have addressed state, not federal,
sentencing practices. Thus, they have addressed the Eighth Amendment only as
incorporated by the Fourteenth. Federal courts accordingly find themselves applying a
deferential standard designed in large part to safeguard the values of federalism in cases
where those values do not call for deference").
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Amendment than a state sentencing statute would, given the extra
deference that the latter is owed under federalism principles. The legal
hook here is that the Eighth Amendment is made binding upon the states
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," and so courts
implicitly apply Fourteenth Amendment rational basis scrutiny in
determining whether state sentences (in non-capital cases) are grossly
disproportionate to the offense. 89 By contrast, federal statutes challenged
under the Eighth Amendment might face something less deferential than
rational basis review. Instead, they would be subject to the Eighth
Amendment's own, native standard of review, which might well turn out
to be stricter than the standard applied under the Eighth Amendment as
read through the Fourteenth Amendment against the states. Adopting this
theory, Judge Cassell could perhaps have concluded that a higher level of
scrutiny would be appropriate in Angelos, such that the court need not
presume that the length of Mr. Angelos' sentence is constitutional.
This legal theory would offer a more morally satisfactory solution
to the judge's dilemma in Angelos than Pure Obedience would. After all,
this theory would avoid imposing such a harsh sentence on Mr. Angelos.
However, the question remains of whether it is sufficiently supported by
the applicable legal reasons to be a Satisficing Option. After all, there are
other grounds besides federalism that could require courts to defer to even
the federal legislature's determination about the proportionality of
sentences. For example, considerations about legislative competence or
sensitivity to popular values might be adduced to justify also deferring to
Furmanv. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972) (holding that "carrying out of the death
penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments").
8 See Christopher J. DeClue, Sugarcoating the Eighth Amendment: The Grossly
Disproportionate Test is Simply the Fourteenth Amendment Rational Basis Test in
Disguise, 41 Sw. L. REV. 533, 533 (2012) ("the Eighth Amendment grossly
disproportionate test is simply the Fourteenth Amendment rational basis test in disguise.
More pointedly, the precise standard of review applied under the grossly disproportionate
test is as follows: when reviewing the length of a sentence under the Eighth Amendment,
the court will uphold the sentence so long as it furthers a conceivable penological
purpose.") (emphasis added).
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federal sentencing laws (and not just their state analogs).
For that reason, we think it would at least be legally questionable if
Judge Cassell had determined that Mr. Angelos' sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment. It appears to be a significant departure from existing
precedent. 90 For this reason, we do not think that striking down the
mandatory minimum provision at issue in Angelos would be a Satisficing
Option that offers an acceptable resolution to the judge's dilemma. It is
not sufficiently well supported by the applicable legal reasons to be a
legally permissible interpretation.
2. Void for Vagueness
Matters are different, we think, when it comes to a second strategy
for striking down mandatory minimums as unconstitutional. In particular,
this is the argument that certain provisions triggering a mandatory
minimum are unconstitutionally vague. In the recent case of Johnson v.
United States, the Supreme Court endorsed just such an argument.91
There, the Court held that the "residual clause" of the Armed Career
Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), is unconstitutionally vague
in violation of the Due Process Clause. 92 This was hailed as a victory by
reform-minded advocates in the fight against overly harsh mandatory
90 Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of
Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 117 (1993) (in Harmelin "no
member of the Court would interfere with a legislative grading of noncapital punishment
for potentially violent crime. Both the concurring and dissenting opinions indicate
judicial disinclination to review even those laws that mandate life imprisonment without
any eligibility for release for offenses that directly threaten the physical safety of others.
Hence, a legislature can be as harsh as it desires without crossing constitutional lines in
mandating incarceration for such matters as possession of weapons in the commission of
offenses").
91 Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
92 Id. at 2563 ("We hold that imposing an increased sentence under the residual clause of
the Armed Career Criminal Act violates the Constitution's guarantee of due process.").
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minimums. 9 3 It would be natural to try to build on this success by using
Johnson as the basis for invalidating analogous provisions that also carry
mandatory minimums-for example, the provision of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
at issue in Angelos. Let us consider the prospects for this argument.
Go back to Johnson for a moment. The ACCA states that any
defendant convicted of a firearms offense under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) who
"has three previous convictions... for a violent felony or a serious drug
offense" must be "imprisoned not less than fifteen years."9 4 A "violent
felony" is defined as a crime that either contains the use of force as an
element, or else "is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk of physical injury to another."9 5 The italicized phrase is the so-called
"residual clause" of the ACCA. 9 6 The Supreme Court in Johnson struck
down the ACCA residual clause-§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)-as
unconstitutionally vague, holding that it "denies fair notice to defendants
and invites arbitrary enforcement by judges." 9 7
Angelos did not involve § 924(e), which was at issue in Johnson,
but rather another provision that contains a similar residual clause-
namely, § 924(c). 98 This provision increases the defendant's sentence by
25 years for each subsequent "crime of violence."99 Moreover, the residual
clause of § 924(c) defines "crime of violence" to include any crime "that
93 Families Against Mandatory Minimums, SCOTUS Strikes Down ACCA's Residual
Clause (June 15, 2016) http://famm.org/scotus-strikes-down-accas-residual-clause/
(quoting Families Against Mandatory Minimums General Counsel Mary Price as stating
that "We are very pleased by this decision. All criminal laws should be clear about what
conduct is criminal," (...). "This is especially true when the law calls for a mandatory
minimum sentence. Today the Supreme Court ruled (decisively) in favor of clarity in one
of the harshest mandatory minimum laws on the books.").
94 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2012)
95 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2012) (emphasis added).
96 Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556.
97 Id. at 2557.
98 See supra notes 23-26.
99§ 924(c)(1)(A)-(C) (2012).
133 [Vol. 6: 1
2018] Resolving Judicial Dilemmas 134
by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the
person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.""oo The italicized phrase here is the § 924(c) residual clause. 101
Now, the question is whether Judge Cassell, were he to decide
Angelos today, would be justified in extending Johnson to cover the
§ 924(c) residual clause as well. 10 2 This would be tempting if Judge
Cassell wanted to resolve his moral-legal dilemma by using the
interpretive strategy. Indeed, a handful of district courts in the Ninth
Circuit have issued decisions doing just this.10 3
Nonetheless, some appellate courts that have considered the
question have held that there are important textual differences between the
ACCA residual clause and the § 924(c) residual clause that prevent the
latter from being struck down as unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.
Most notably, this argument was rejected by the Sixth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Taylor because of textual differences between the two
residual clauses.104 Specifically, the ACCA residual clause focuses on
100 § 924(c)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
101 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 215 F.Supp.3d 1026, (D. Nev. 2016); United States
v. Thongsouk Theng Lattanaphom, 159 F.Supp.3d 1157 (E.D. Cal. 2016).
102 Note that accepting argument would in any case not have helped Mr. Angelos.
Although he was convicted of several violations of § 924(c) and received the applicable
mandatory minimums, the crimes of violence he committed did not qualify as such under
the residual clause of § 924(c)(3)(B). Rather, they counted as crimes of violence under §
924(c)(3)(A).
103 See Smith, 215 F.Supp.3d at 1035-36 (extending Johnson to § 924(c)'s residual clause
and striking it down as void for vagueness); Thongsouk Theng Lattanaphom, 159
F.Supp.3d 1157 at 1162 (same); United States v. Bell, 158 F.Supp.3d 906, at 922-23
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (same).
104 United States v. Taylor, 814 F.3d 340, 376 (6th Cir. 2016) ("There are significant
differences making the definition of "crime of violence" in § 924(c)(3)(B) narrower than
the definition of "violent felony" in the ACCA residual clause."). See id. at 376-77
("Whereas the ACCA residual clause merely requires conduct "that presents a serious
potential risk of physical injury to another," § 924(c)(3)(B) requires the risk "that
physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense." Risk of physical force against a victim is much more definite
than [the potential] risk of physical injury to a victim." (internal citations omitted)).
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conduct that poses a "potential risk" of "physical injury," while the
§ 924(c) residual clause mentions a "substantial risk" of "physical force"
used in the course of committing an offense. 105 The former phrase seems
more vague than the latter, since it's not clear what the ACCA meant by a
potential risk (as opposed to merely a risk). Moreover, in principle, any
type of conduct-even conduct that does not involve force against another
(e.g. telling a lie)-could potentially risk causing physical injury to others,
and so arguably would be a crime of violence under the ACCA-though
perhaps not under the § 924(c) residual clause. Other courts to have
declined to apply Johnson to § 924(c) rely on similar textual
differences. 1 0 6
Now, suppose that Judge Cassell wanted to extricate himself from
the dilemma he faced in Angelos using the interpretive strategy. To do so,
he would seek to minimize or explain away the textual differences
between the § 924(c) and the ACCA residual clauses. For example, he
might assume that the use of the phrase "potential risk" in § 924(e) rather
than "substantial risk," as in § 924(c), was inartful drafting rather than the
mark of an intended substantive difference between the two residual
clauses. Adopting this sort of reasoning would accomplish the more
morally desirable outcome of not having to sentence Mr. Angelos under
the mandatory minimum in § 924(c).
1os Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (defining, for purposes of the ACCA, the term
'violent felony" as one that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential
risk ofphysical injury to another") with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) (defining "crime of
violence" as one "that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against
the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense")
(emphasis added).
106 United States v. Dervishaj, 169 F.Supp.3d 339, 350 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing
textual differences between the two residual clauses, and holding that "defendants have
not established that § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague"); see also id. at 348, n. 13
(discussing other district courts that have declined to find § 924(c)(3)(B) void for
vagueness underJohnson); United States v. Green, No. CR RDB-15-0526, 2016 WL
277982, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 22, 2016) ("In light of the many differences between the
residual clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B) and the Armed Career Criminal Act's residual
clause, (...) the residual clause in Section 924(c)(3)(B) is not unconstitutionally vague.").
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Is this interpretation sufficiently well supported on legal grounds?
As it turns out, there is circuit split as to whether the Supreme Court's
invalidation of the ACCA residual clause in Johnson also requires
invalidating the residual clause of § 924(c), at issue in Angelos. To begin
with, there are several appellate decisions suggesting that § 924(c) is to be
interpreted so that it is governed by the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson. Most importantly, the Ninth Circuit in Dimaya v. Lynch struck
down a third residual clause, which is practically identical to § 924(c), on
the basis of Johnson.10 7 This, in turn, led some district courts in the Ninth
Circuit to hold that the § 924(c) residual clause itself is unconstitutionally
vague under Johnson. 10s
More specifically, in Dimaya v. Lynch,109 the Ninth Circuit held
that Johnson requires invalidating the residual clause of the definition of
"crime of violence" that is provided in the Immigration and Naturalization
Act ("INA"), 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)-despite the same textual differences that
exist from the ACCA residual clause, § 924(e). The INA residual clause
defines "crime of violence" to include any felony "that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force." 110 The court in Dimaya
held that the Johnson Court's "reasoning applies with equal force to the
similar statutory language and identical mode of analysis used to define a
107 Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2015).
10sSee Thongsouk ThengLattanaphom, 159 F.Supp.3d at 1162 ("Existing authority in the
Ninth Circuit compels this court to extend Johnson to the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. §
924(c)"); Smith, 215 F.Supp.3d at 1035 ("1 find no basis to distinguish 18 U.S.C. § 16(b)
from § 924(c)'s residual clause or Dimaya from this case. Though many districts outside
of the Ninth Circuit have declined to extend Johnson to § 924(c)'s residual clause, none
of those courts are bound by the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dimaya invalidating the
INA's identically worded residual provision. The binding authority in this circuit thus
compels me to conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutionally vague.");
Bell, 158 F.Supp.3d 906 at 923 (finding that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dimaya
requires the court to reject as "not material" the textual differences between the 924(c)(3)
residual clause and the 924(e) or ACCA residual clause).
109 Dimaya, 803 F.3d 1110.
110 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012).
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crime of violence for purposes of the INA.""' It concluded that "because
of the same combination of indeterminate inquiries, [the INA residual
clause] is subject to identical unpredictability and arbitrariness as ACCA's
residual clause," and was therefore unconstitutionally vague under
Johnson.112
Note that the Ninth Circuit was not alone in this reasoning. The
Seventh Circuit has also applied Johnson to strike down the INA residual
clause on similar grounds. 1 1 3 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit adopted this
reasoning in Golicov v. Lynch, a case which expressly followed the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Dimaya.114 Thus, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits are
aligned with the Ninth in seeing the textual differences between the INA
and ACCA residual clauses as fairly trifling.
This matters to us because the INA residual clause is equivalent to
the § 924(c) residual clause at issue in Angelos. Neither one mentions a
"potential risk" of "physical injury" as § 924(e) in Johnson did. Rather,
the INA and § 924(c) residual clauses mention only a "substantial risk that
physical force... may be used in the course of committing the offense." 15
116 Thus, the courts that reach this result about the INA residual clause
provide persuasive authority for also invalidating the § 924(c) residual
clause under Johnson.
However, matters are not so straightforward because some
appellate courts have expressly rejected this argument. Most importantly,
... Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1115.
112 d.
113 United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2015).
114 Golicov v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1065, 1072 (10th Cir. 2016) ("[W]e agree with the Sixth,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is not meaningfully distinguishable
from the ACCA's residual clause and that, as a result, § 16(b), and by extension 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(a)(43)(F), must be deemed unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson.").
115 Cf § 924(c)(3) and § 16(b).
116 Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1120 ("Although the government can point to a couple of minor
distinctions between the text of the [ACCA] residual clause and that of the INA's
definition of a crime of violence, none undermines the applicability of Johnson 's
fundamental holding to this case.").
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the Second Circuit, in United States v. Hill,'17 found Dimaya and the other
appellate decisions striking down the INA residual clause under Johnson
to be unpersuasive given the textual differences between the ACCA
residual clause in Johnson and the INA residual clause.118 Therefore, the
Second Circuit declined to follow their lead in applying Johnson to the §
924(c) residual clause.1 19 Accordingly, the Second Circuit refused to strike
down the § 924(c) residual clause as unconstitutionally vague under
Johnson.120 The Sixth Circuit took a similar position in Taylor, and found
substantial textual differences between § 924(c) and the ACCA residual
clause at issue in Johnson.12 1
Accordingly, there is a split of authority as to whether the Supreme
Court's invalidation of the ACCA residual clause in Johnson also requires
invalidating the residual clause of § 924(c), at issue in Angelos. On the one
hand, the Sixth and Second Circuits found sufficient textual differences
between the ACCA and § 924(c) residual clauses to prevent Johnson from
requiring the invalidation of § 924(c).122 On the other hand, the Seventh,
Ninth and Tenth Circuits found Johnson to require at least invalidating the
INA residual clause, which is practically indistinguishable from the §
924(c) residual clause. 123
Thus, consider Judge Cassell's situation as though he were faced
117 United States v. Hill, 832 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2016).
... Id. at 149 (noting that "four other circuits... have considered the language in 18
U.S.C. § 16(b), which appears materially the same as that in § 924(c)(3)(B), and have
determined that § 16(b) is void for vagueness after Johnson," but noting that "we find
these opinions unpersuasive").
119 Id. at 150 ("we do not find these § 16(b) cases persuasive, and we decline to follow
their reasoning here").
120 Id. ("Having considered each of Hill's arguments that the risk-of-force clause is
unconstitutionally vague, we are unpersuaded.").
121 See Taylor, supra note 104, at 376.
122 See supra notes 104 (discussing the Sixth Circuit's decision in Taylor), 117-119
(discussing the Second Circuit's decision in Hill).
123 See supra notes 109 (discussing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dimaya), 113-114
(discussing similar cases from the Seventh and Tenth Circuits).
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with applying a sentencing enhancement under § 924(c) today. Judge
Cassell was sitting in the District of Utah, which is within the Tenth
Circuit. Plausibly, he would be bound to invalidate the § 924(c) residual
clause under Golicov, which invalidated the INA residual clause under
Johnson (just like the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dimaya).1 2 4
To make matters more theoretically interesting, instead suppose
Judge Cassell were sitting within a Circuit that had yet to weigh in on
whether Johnson's invalidation of the ACCA residual clause carries over
to the INA or § 924(c) residual clauses. Suppose Judge Cassell's court
were within the D.C. Circuit, for instance. What situation would he then
face? A very close call. On the one hand, he could rely on the Second and
Sixth Circuits' reasoning as persuasive authority for declining to strike
down § 924(c) as unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. On the other
hand, he could follow the reasoning of the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits, which invalidated the essentially indistinguishable INA residual
clause on the basis of Johnson, and therefore decide to strike down §
924(c) under Johnson as well. Reasonable minds, it would appear, can
differ.
Given that there is a Circuit split on this issue, we think that if
Judge Cassell were deciding the case today while sitting within a Circuit
that had yet to decide the matter, it would be legally acceptable to strike
down § 924(c) on the basis of Johnson relying on the Seventh, Ninth and
Tenth Circuit's decisions as persuasive authority. This would be a
Satisficing Option of the sort that we think judges should adopt where
possible. Given the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuit's reasoning, a
hypothetical Judge Cassell would have a plausible legal basis for
invalidating § 924(c) under Johnson, and so it would lead to what we take
to be the distinctively morally better outcome. What is more, this decision
is at least defensible by the lights of the law. The Seventh, Ninth and
Tenth Circuits did not think there were sufficient textual differences to
treat the INA residual clause, which is identical to § 924(c), any
differently from the ACCA residual clause-i.e. as unconstitutionally
124 Golicov, 837 F.3d at 1072.
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vague. Accordingly, we think someone in Judge Cassell's position today
should resolve the close call on the legal question by appealing to the
decisive moral reasons against applying the § 924(c) residual clause to a
defendant like Mr. Angelos whose minor offenses do not warrant such
harsh sentences. We can
numerically represent this scenario as follows:
6TH & 2D CIR. (DON'T 7TH, 9TH & 10TH CIR.
EXTEND JOHNSON TO (EXTEND JOHNSON TO
§ 924(c)) § 924(c))
MORAL REASONS 2 7
LEGAL REASONS 7 7
Faced with a scenario like this, we think it would be sound for Judge
Cassell to break the tie on the legal question by appealing to (what we
assume to be) the decisive moral reasons in favor of invalidating the §
924(c) residual clause and thus preventing the harsh mandatory minimum
sentences it triggers from being widely applied.
So far, we have only argued that moral reasons can break a strict
numerical tie on a legal question. But we would also go slightly further
than that. We think overwhelming moral reasons can not only break a
strict tie, but also be the basis for resolving a very close legal question,
which is not quite a tie.
Thus, for the sake of argument, suppose that the Second and Sixth
Circuits have a slightly better legal position when compared to the
Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits' position. That is, suppose arguendo
that the textual differences that the Second and Sixth Circuits picked up on
between the ACCA and § 924(c) residual clauses are robust enough that
strictly speaking the best legal resolution of the case would be to refrain
from invalidating the § 924(c) residual clause under Johnson. Still, the
question remains a close call. There are also weighty legal reasons in favor
of invalidation, given the close textual parallels between the ACCA and §
924(c) residual clauses. These are what led the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits to strike down the INA residual clause (given that the INA and §
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924(c) residual clauses are the same). Plausibly, the remaining differences
that exist between the ACCA and the § 924(c) residual clauses-e.g. that
the former says "potential risk" while the latter says "substantial risk"-
are not robust enough to save the § 924(c) residual clause from the degree
of vagueness that felled the ACCA residual clause. Some might think the
§ 924(c) residual clause remains vague to an unconstitutional degree. But
even supposing that this interpretation is slightly less well supported by
the applicable legal reasons, it is still a close enough a call to be at least
legally defensible to strike down the § 924(c) residual clause under
Johnson. Thus, consider the case might not be a strict tie on the legal
question, but rather can be represented in the following way:
6TH & 2D CIR. (DON'T 7TH, 9TH & 10TH CIR.
EXTEND JOHNSON TO (EXTEND JOHNSON TO
§ 924(c)) § 924(c))
MORAL 2 7
REASONS
LEGAL 7.1 7
REASONS
We contend that because there is strong legal support for either option
here-even if the Sixth Circuit position is slightly better, legally
speaking-extending Johnson to § 924(c) is a Satisficing Option that
Judge Cassell should take. Given the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuit
decisions, a Judge Cassell (deciding Angelos today in the D.C. Circuit)
would be justified in striking down the § 924(c) residual clause following
the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. There is weighty legal backing for
this decision and it is decisively favored by the moral reasons. In this way,
we think appeal to decisive moral reasons can not only serve as a way to
break a strict numerical tie on a legal issue, but can also be the basis for
resolving a very close legal question, which is not strictly a tie-as
represented in the table above. Where it is not a close call, legally
speaking, however, the judge would not be dealing with a genuinely
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Satisficing Option, and so we think it would not be properly available. 125
One final note: the posture assumed in the above discussion will
not last long. The Supreme Court is about to rule on whether to endorse
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Dimaya, which extended Johnson to
invalidate the INA residual clause.126 Our analysis sought to draw an
interesting lesson from considering the position of the hypothetical Judge
Cassell who has to re-decide Angelos today while not being decisively
bound by a precedential decision of a superior court. But if the Supreme
Court rejects the Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits' reasoning, then this
would no longer be a legally available interpretation. Hence it would not
be a Satisficing Option, on our view. To be a Satisficing Option that
would genuinely resolve the judge's dilemma, a legal interpretation cannot
125 Note one limitation of our argument. We do not contend that Judges who resolve a
close call on a legal question on the basis of decisive moral reasons should always come
out and say that this is what they are doing. We are agnostic on this difficult prudential
and strategic question. Perhaps coming out and saying that they are resolving a legally
close call on clear moral grounds would be favored for transparency reasons. On the
other hand, this might also be disfavored for reasons of preserving trust in the neutrality
of the judicial system-to say nothing of being disfavored by career advancement reasons
in a judicial system like the United States.
126 See Kevin Johnson, Argument analysis: Is the statutory phrase "crime ofviolence" in
the immigration laws void for vagueness? (Jan. 18, 2017) (available online:
http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/argument-analysis-statutory-phrase-crime-violence-
immigration-laws-void-vagueness/) (analyzing the oral arguments in Dimaya and
concluding that "[e]ven if the justices are willing to apply due process scrutiny to Section
16(b), however, they appear to be divided as to whether this case is distinguishable from
Johnson v. United States and whether Section 16(b) is void for vagueness").
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expressly be ruled out by a precedential decision of a higher court. 1 2 7
B. EXPRESSIVE STRATEGIES
We have contrasted two constitutional challenges to mandatory
minimums in order to illustrate how judges can adopt morally preferable
and legally permissible albeit sub-optimal interpretations of the law. That
is the first type of strategy we think judges can take on their own to
resolve judicial dilemmas. The second type of strategy we will consider is
expressive, in the sense that it consists of the judiciary expressing its moral
condemnation of the laws that it applies. Like the first, this is also a
strategy that judges can adopt on their own. Though unlike interpretative
strategies, the expression of judicial condemnation is not confined to the
courtroom: judges can express condemnation in a range of venues. We
think that it is worth separating two outlets for the expression of moral
condemnation by the judiciary.
The first outlet is in judicial decisions as dicta. Judge Paul Cassell,
for instance, originally decried that Weldon Angelos' sentence was
"unjust, cruel, and irrational" in the sentencing decision itself. 128 A
number of other judges have similarly expressed condemnation of
127 This also raises potential moral risks for judges pursuing such an interpretative
strategy: the judge must consider how their decision changes the conditional probability
that a higher court would issue a precedential decision on the interpretative issue at hand
and thereby close off opportunities for other lower courts to resolve such judicial
dilemmas. Say that a judge on a lower court knows both (a) that she is subject to
unusually close scrutiny (and hence is more likely to have her decisions appealed to
higher courts), and (b) that the current higher courts are more likely to issue a verdict that
closes off options for resolving judicial dilemmas. Plausibly, there would be good moral
reasons for such a judge to eschew this interpretative strategy (and pursue the other
strategies outlined below), in order to increase the odds that it is left available to others.
128Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1263.
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- * * *129mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in judicial decisions-
especially in the Eastern District of New York.130 It is conceivable that
judges could take this expressive strategy further. For instance, judges
could attach a stock paragraph to every legal opinion that they issue-
regardless of whether it is a civil or a criminal case-that decries the
injustice of certain types of mandatory minimum sentences.
The second outlet is in extra-judicial writing: Cassell condemned
the mandatory minimum sentencing provision in application to Angelos in
a number of academic articles, 1 3 1 speeches, and opinion pieces in popular
media outlets. 132 Other prominent judges have similarly condemned
mandatory minimums in these forums. 133
It is important to distinguish these outlets for expressive strategies
in part because it is plausible that some legal reasons militate against
129 See, e.g., United States v. Wendell Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2017)
(agreeing that the sentence was "extraordinarily long" though rejecting 8 th Amendment
challenge); see also id. at 20 (decrying the defendant's sentence as "draconian" and
"grossly disproportionate to his offense") (Torruella, J., dissenting).
130 Judges Weinstein, Gleeson, Dearie and Block are notable examples.
131 Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe? A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (And a
Critique of the Federal Mandatory Minimums), 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1017. 2004); Paul
Cassell and Erik Luna, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (2010); Paul G.
Cassell and Erik Luna, Sense and Sensibility in Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, Federal
Sentencing Reporter (2011).
132 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Weldon Angelos is free, but many more still wait for justice
reform, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jun. 12, 2016. Cassell also made written statements
available to reporters for popular media outlets. See, e.g., Sari Horwitz, Former federal
judge to President Obama: Free the man I sentenced to 55 years in prison, WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 6, 2016 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2016/02/09/former-federal-judge-to-president-obama-free-the-man-i-
sentenced-to-55-years-in-prison/); Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Report on
Weldon Angelos (http://famm.org/weldon-angelos/); The Sentenced Project, Profile on
Weldon Angelos (http://thesentencedproject.com/).
133 Alan Feuer, Federal Judge Urges U.S. to 'Jettison the Madness of Mass
Incarceration', N. Y. TIMES, June 23, 2016
(http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/24/nyregion/federal-judge-urges-us-to-jettison-the-
madness-of-mass-incarceration.html?smid=re-share&_r-0).
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expressing condemnation in dicta in particular. For the judiciary to
condemn legislation on purely moral grounds in judicial opinions could
compromise the appearance of impartiality at the crucial point at which
judges exercise their duties of office; we think it is plausible that no
similar legal reasons militate against the judiciary expressing outrage in
extra-judicial writing, or, if they do, those reasons have less force in such
contexts.134 Given this, there is at least some basis for considering
expressive strategies to not meet a legal ideal, in comparison to pure
obedience. But we do not think that it is plausible that judges are legally
required to not decry that the laws they must apply are unjust, cruel and
irrational. In other words, expressive strategies are not legally ideal
(especially if they may run up against the limits of the canons of
professional ethics), but they are often legally permissible.
It is also important to distinguish these outlets for expressive
strategies because somewhat different moral reasons count in their favor.
Extra-judicial writing plays an important role with respect to informing the
public: within a deliberative democracy, it draws attentions to politically
relevant injustices in the legal system that might not otherwise be salient
to the voting populace. The moral significance of this should not be
understated. There is some evidence that public support for mandatory
134 This is not to say that judges who express strong disapproval of existing legislation
will not take any flack for it. Quite the contrary, we are aware that this can have
professional and political consequences, as well as impacting the management of judges'
caseloads. For example, District Judge Shira Scheindlin was rebuked by the Second
Circuit and removed from a case in part for extra-judicial criticism of New York City's
Stop-and-Frisk policies. See Pete Brush, 2nd Circ. Stop-And-Frisk Rebuke A Warning To
Chatty Judges, Law360 (Nov. 1, 2013) (https://www.1aw360.com/articles/485420/2nd-
circ-stop-and-frisk-rebuke-a-warning-to-chatty-judges) ("The panel stayed [Judge
Scheindlin's] rulings pending appeal and said Scheindlin 'ran afoul' - both in
a courtroom statement and in comments to the news media - of the requirement that
judges 'avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety' in their activities."). Ligon
v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 2013) (vacated on other grounds)
(observing that "b]y order dated October 31, 2013, we both granted that stay and,
because the appearance of impartiality had been compromised by certain statements
made by Judge Scheindlin during proceedings in the district court and in media
interviews, we reassigned the cases to a different district judge, to be chosen randomly").
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minimums is undergirded by a familiar bias: the "availability heuristic".
Mandatory minimums are popular when considered in the abstract,
because when the public accepts the generic proposition that drug dealers
who use firearms should be subject to minimum sentences of x years, they
are likely to assess its merits in terms of the most cognitively accessible
instance of that group: a real or imagined individual who is far more likely
to resemble El Chapo than Weldon Angelos. 135 When members of the
public are asked to consider the application of mandatory minimums to
particular cases with facts like those in Angelos, support for these policies
plummets. Since the expressive strategy can help make cases like Angelos
more publicly salient and accessible, it can thereby help ensure that the
voting public assess mandatory minimums with a clearer sense of their
impacts on offenders. To be clear, we are not claiming that an opinion
piece in the Washington Post has this effect on its own. Rather, we think
that extra-judicial writing can help bring more sustained media attention to
mandatory minimums in general and cases like Angelos in particular. For
instance, HBO's Last Week Tonight with John Oliver may not have
discussed Angelos if not for Cassell's extra-judicial writings. 136 That said,
in a highly partisan political climate in which some already see the
judiciary as a partisan political force, we recognize that should the
judiciary express disapproval or even outrage, there may be unintended
short or long term negative consequences in the public perception of, or
discourse about, the judiciary. We think that such risks must be evaluated
on a case-by-case basis. It would be folly to assume that all extra-judicial
expressions of condemnation-or none of them, for that matter-would be
morally permissible.
Since judicial opinions in the lower courts are rarely read by the
135 See Loretta J. Stalans, Citizens' crime stereotypes, biased recall, and punishment
preferences in abstract cases: The educative role of interpersonal sources, 17 L. &
HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 451-70 (1993).
136 See John Oliver, Last Week Tonight, Report on Mandatory Minimums (July 26, 2015);
Melissa Locker, Watch John Oliver Demand an End to Mandatory Minimum Sentencing
Laws, TIME (July 27, 2017) (http://time.com/3972717/watch-john-oliver-last-week-
tonight-mandatory-minimum-laws/).
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voting public, or discussed in popular media, we do not think that such
democratic considerations have much force in relation to expressing
condemnation in dicta. However, we think that a number of moral
considerations have significant force here. For one, we think that it is
morally important to the judiciary that they use dicta to morally condemn
at least the most egregiously unjust laws that they are nonetheless legally
required to apply. In part, we think this is plausible for considerations
related to the moral integrity of the sentencing judge:1 37 in other contexts,
such as voting, it is often recognized that there are some self-regarding
moral reasons to maintain one's moral integrity.138 Moreover, the judiciary
has moral reasons to condemn mandatory minimums in dicta in order to
influence other judges. In a law review article published shortly after the
Angelos decision, it was noted that "Judge Cassell's actions may augur a
new wave of judicial decision-writing in which judges record their
observations about evolving sentencing norms and in so doing expand the
post-Booker sentencing discussion to include mandatory minimums." 139
There is at least some evidence that Cassell's actions have had this
influence. For instance, the majority in Rivera-Ruperto noted that in that
case "the dissent relies largely on the rationale of Judge Cassell in United
States v. Angelos." 140
There are further moral reasons in favor of expressive strategies as
well. For instance, we think that it can be meaningful and morally
137 There is a large literature on expressive and symbolic duties, as well as duties of
protest. Bernard R. Boxill, Self-Respect and Protest, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 58 (1976);
Thomas E. Hill, Symbolic Protest and Calculated Silence, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 83 (1979).
138 See Loren Lomasky and Geoffrey Brennan, Is there a Duty to Vote, 17 SOCIAL PHIL.
AND POLICY 62 (2000) (discussing expressive norms).
139 Eva S. Nilsen, Indecent Standards: The Case of U.S. versus Weldon Angelos, 11
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 537, 541 (2006).
140 United States v. Wendell Rivera-Ruperto, 852 F.3d 1, 18-19 n.21 (1st Cir. 2017).
This arguably shows that mandatory minimums present what has been dubbed the "sticky
norms problem," namely that "the prevalence of a social norm [e.g. against overly harsh
sentences] makes decision makers reluctant to carry out a law intended to change that
norm." Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 YALE L.J. 607, 607 (2000).
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important to particular defendants that judges condemn unjust
punishments in dicta. A standard view about the nature and justification of
punishment is that both are in part expressivist: punishment necessarily
involves the expression of blame, and whether it is justified in part
depends on whether the expression of blame is fitting or appropriate. 14 1 In
other words, the severity of Angelos' punishment is unjust in part because
of the inappropriate severity of the moral condemnation of his character
and conduct that it expresses. For Cassell to decry the injustice of the
punishment he imposes undermines the condemnation expressed by the
punishment itself. And this is not merely symbolic: it puts the defendant in
a position where he or she can helpfully point to an authoritative
expression of the injustice of his or her punishment in, for instance,
applying for parole, or applying for employment upon release.
Given this, we think there are important moral reasons that favor
expressive strategies, and such strategies carry comparatively small moral
risks. This makes them a fairly safe option. But expressive strategies also
have obvious limitations, especially with respect to the defendants who are
wronged by the criminal justice system. Angelos' severe punishment does
more than express unwarranted condemnation: it imposes hardships and
restricts liberties. Decrying the injustice of such outcomes provides little
comfort to those who suffer them. And plausibly, the fact that judges were
intimately involved in the imposition of such hardships in past cases, and
would be again in future cases, generates strong retrospective and
prospective moral reasons for the judiciary to make reparations (to past
defendants) and minimize harm (to future defendants).142 Given this, our
verdict is that expressive strategies may not always be morally sufficient:
in especially egregious cases, they may be a crucial component in
resolving judicial dilemmas, but on their own they do not satisfice the
moral considerations that apply to judges in judicial dilemmas.
141 The locus classicus for this view is Joel Feinberg's work. See JOEL FEINBERG, The
Expressive Function ofPunishment, in DOING AND DESERVING (1970).
142 These fall under two of the five fundamental prima facie moral duties famously
discussed by Ross. W.D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930).
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C. ASSISTIVE STRATEGIES
The last two strategies we discussed were ones that judges can put
to good use themselves without the aid of other actors. By contrast, the
next three strategies aim to enlist the help of other actors in securing
morally preferable, but still legally permissible, outcomes. Thus, the third
class of strategies that we will consider is assistive, in the sense that these
strategies consist of the judiciary assisting or advocating on behalf of
defendants for specific remedies from other actors outside the legal
system. Generally, the assistive strategy will be most appropriate at or
after the conclusion of the criminal trial. (In sub-sections D and E, we will
consider attempts to enlist the help of specifically judicial actors, where
some of these steps might also be taken before the trial concludes.)
The most obvious (but to be clear, not the only1 4 3) example of an
assistive strategy thus would be for the judge to attempt to secure
reprieves and pardons from the executive. This strategy is naturally
coupled with suggestive strategies: judges are in a unique position to not
only condemn unjust punishment of the accused, but also call on the
executive to redress this injustice.
The Constitution grants the President the power "to grant
Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States," 1 4 4 and the
executive retains wide discretion in exercising this power. As such, one
safe option for the judiciary to take is to call out the injustice of a
particular mandatory minimum sentence and recommend that the
143 For example, judges might also encourage defendants to pursue a college education
while incarcerated or after completion of the sentence-perhaps even offering a letter of
support or recommendation for deserving parties. Last year, a federal judge issued a
"federal certificate of rehabilitation" to a woman he had sentenced over a decade earlier.
See Doe v. United States, 168 F.Supp.3d 427, 429 (E.D.N.Y. 2016). There has also been
litigation as to whether district courts have the power to expunge not only arrest records,
but convictions after completion. Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2016). Such
tools might be tried more often. This list is not meant to be exhaustive but rather
illustrative of the range of options that could be pursued.
U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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executive issue a commutation.
Judicial involvement in clemency is typically limited to "when a
sentencing judge is asked to make a recommendation in a particular
pardon case."145 Some judges have taken on a more active involvement in
the clemency process by recommending commutation in dicta in their
judicial opinions. Judge Paul Cassell, for instance, did so in Angelos.14 6
This is rare, but by no means the only case of a judge explicitly
recommending clemency in a judicial opinion. 147 Judges can also
recommend clemency in public or private extra-judicial writings: Cassell
continued to call for Angelos' sentence to be commuted in public forums
and in, for instance, privately petitioning President Obama to "swiftly"
commute Angelos' sentence in February 2016.
Interestingly, the rarity of active judicial involvement in the
clemency process is a relatively new phenomenon. In the early years of
the Republic, "federal judges were, then as now, sometimes required by
law to impose punishments they considered unjust," and in such situations
judges recommended a grant of clemency "more frequently than they do
today, and with greater expectation of success" than today. 148 Such
recommendations were frequently solicited after defendants petitioned the
President for clemency, but judges were also known to take "the initiative
in approaching the President." 1 4 9
Plausibly, for the judiciary to actively advocate on behalf of
defendants-especially in dicta-could undermine their impartiality, and
145 The 2009 Criminal Justice Transition Coalition, Smart on Crime: Recommendations
for the Next Congress 117 (Nov. 5, 2008) (emphasis added).
146 Angelos, 345 F. Supp. 2d at 1262.
147 See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 946 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1991) (Sachs,
C.J.), United States v. McDade, 639 F. Supp. 2d 77, 86 (D.D.C. 2009) (Friedman, J.)
("urge[ing] the President to consider executive clemency for McDade and to reduce
McDade's sentence").
14s George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential
Mercy: The Role ofJudges in Pardon Cases, 1790-1850, 16 FED SENT'G REP. 212, 212
(2004).
149 Id. at 213.
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the appearance thereof. So, there are some grounds to consider this
practice legally sub-optimal. But we do not think these grounds amount to
a legal duty, and any claim to the contrary would have the revisionary
implication that a rare practice today that was relatively common practice
in the early years of the Republic was legally impermissible all along. We
find that implication implausible. This suggests that this option satisfices
judges' legal reasons.
We also think that there is a range of moral reasons for the
judiciary to take an active role in the clemency process. Some concern
judges' moral reasons to rectify unjust punishments that they have
imposed: plausibly, Cassell has strong moral reasons to be concerned with
Angelos' fate given the role that he played in imposing Angelos'
punishment. Following other recent scholars, we also think that there are
two more general moral reasons for judges to play an active and public
role in the clemency process, whether they do so formally, 150 or
informally.1 5 1 The first of these is the "alarming decline in the number of
pardons and commutations granted by presidents," which suggest "a need
to look to the courts to help 'reinvigorate' the power." 15 2 Prominently
recommending clemency in judicial opinions, and persistently repeating
such recommendations in extra-judicial writing, could help reverse this
decline.
The second reason is the appearance, if not reality, that "clemency
decisions can potentially violate Equal Protection or Due Process
principles." 15 3 Margaret Love, a former U.S. Pardon Attorney, recently
wrote that
as the official route to clemency has all but closed, the back-door
15o See Daniel T. Kobil, Compelling Mercy: Judicial Review and the Clemency Power, 9
U. ST. THOMAS L. J. 698 (2012).
151 See Joanna Huang, Correcting Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendations of
Executive Clemency, 60 DuKE L.J. 131 (2010).
152 See Kobil, supra note 150, at 698.
153 id.
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route has opened wide. In the past two administrations, petitioners
with personal or political connections in the White House bypassed
the pardon bureaucracy in the Department of Justice, disregarded
its regulations, and obtained clemency by means (and sometimes
on grounds) not available to the less privileged. 154
Similar accusations have been leveled at the use of executive clemency
power by the states, especially by former Oklahoma Governor J.C.
Walton, and former Ohio Governor Richard F. Celeste.1 55
Since the judiciary is independent of the executive and best
positioned to assess offenders' culpability, granting clemency following
sentencing judges' recommendations in judicial opinions could improve
the appearance, if not reality, of consistent and merit-based commutations.
For these reasons, calls for clemency by the judiciary should be welcomed
on moral grounds.
That said, our ultimate assessment of assistive strategies is similar
to our assessment of expressive ones: even though assistive strategies do
have some chance of redressing the hardship that the particular defendant
suffers, those chances are far too low for this strategy to be morally
sufficient on its own. The alarming decline in the number of Presidential
pardons and commutations makes it very unlikely that efforts to secure
pardons for offenders like Angelos will be successful. That was true under
President Obama, and it is all the more obviously true today: both
President Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions have publicly
championed the War on Drugs and tougher sentences for drug
traffickers,156 So we can expect offenders like Angelos to be even less
likely to receive pardons under the current administration.
154 Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight ofPardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1169 (2010).
155 See Huang, supra note 151, at 150.
156 See e.g. Lois Becket, How Jeff Sessions and Donald Trump Have Restarted the War
on Drugs, THE GUARDIAN, August 21 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2017/aug/2 1/donald-trump-jeff-sessions-war-on-drugs.
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Indeed, even in the unlikely event that a judge advocates for a
Presidential pardon and one is granted, we think the judge still may not
have done enough to satisfy the moral obligations she owes to similarly
situated defendants. This is because it is largely a matter of moral luck that
such an endeavor was successful. 17 Plausibly, when one judge petitions
successfully for an offender to receive a pardon and another judge is
unsuccessful in that same endeavor, this is less likely to reflect the merits
of their respective cases for a reprieve, or their efforts and skills in
publicly or privately petitioning for executive action. It is more likely to
reflect factors beyond their control, such as the political climate at the
time, or their (perceived) partisan alignment. If this is right, then if we
think that the unsuccessful advocate did not do enough (morally
speaking), we should hold the same verdict with regard to the successful
advocate: unless there is some morally relevant difference in their
conduct, neither did enough for wronged defendants; one was just
lucky.1 58
Even if one disagrees about this last point, we think there is a
further reason why even successfully petitioning for a Presidential pardon
is not by itself sufficient to satisfy all the judge's moral reasons. Pardons
typically target a select group of offenders. Securing a pardon for an
individual like Angelos is likely to do little to help the many other
similarly situated offenders; it is, moreover, very unlikely to help the
enormous number of individuals who accept unfavorable plea bargains in
order to avoid being subject to mandatory minimums. Offender-specific
advocacy, then, does too little to address the systematic injustices imposed
by mandatory minimums, for which the judiciary bear some moral
responsibility. Plausibly, the moral reasons that apply to judges also
support taking actions to rectify these systemic injustices that mandatory
minimums predictably lead to. We will consider some such steps judges
might take in this direction in the next section.
We should emphasize, however, that in arguing that expressive and
157 See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 24-38 (1979); BERNARD WILLIAMS,
MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973-1980, 20-39 (1981).
15 8 id.
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assistive strategies on their own may fail to satisfice the demands of
morality, we are not ruling out that these strategies can form an integral
part of a Satisficing Option. It may be, for instance, that it is morally
permissible (though still not optimal) for a judge to combine
interpretative, assistive, and expressive strategies. Here the legal costs may
aggregate: a judge who pursued this approach may compromise the
appearance of judicial impartiality to a degree that, while legally
permissible, is far from optimal. But the moral gains would also
aggregate: that judge would also do far more to help specific defendants
(through increasing their odds of receiving an offender-specific remedy)
while also helping similarly situated defendants (through increasing
democratic opposition to mandatory minimums and/or rendering void their
vague provisions). It also may be that in specific contexts no two of these
strategies would be morally sufficient; the third would be necessary, even
if not sufficient, for the judges' conduct to satisfice the demands of
morality. This illustrates how the assessment of specific strategies in
isolation does not settle whether they can form part of a genuine
Satisficing Option. And in doing so, it also illustrates the importance of
the diachronic assessment of judges' choices in judicial dilemmas: if we
only considered in isolation a choice made in interpreting the law at trial,
in expressing condemnation at sentencing, or in advocating for a pardon
post-sentencing, we may miss how this sequence of choices constitutes a
Satisficing Option, even though no specific choice did.
D. COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES
This section focuses on a type of strategy that is similar in spirit to
the assistive strategies just discussed, but while the latter help harmed
parties to obtain relief from other branches of government, the strategies
discussed in this section involve pushing for cooperation from legal actors
within the court system. These cooperative strategies can be pursued in
tandem with others on our list. The aim is to enlist the help of prosecutors
or other legal actors to open up legally available avenues for securing
morally preferable solutions to a particular case or class of cases, which
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otherwise would not be easily available.
Cooperative strategies come in many varieties. Sometimes a judge
might use carrots to incentivize legal actors to voluntarily collaborate to
find morally preferable solutions that remain legally available. Other
times, the judge might resort to sticks of various kinds to compel such
cooperation. Moreover, some cooperative strategies are ex post responses
to a judicial dilemma that has already arisen in a particular case. As we
will see, several courts have recently used such a strategy effectively to re-
open cases where the other apparent options for avoiding injustice have
been exhausted. By contrast, other cooperative strategies-like alternative
sentencing programs-are ex ante efforts to prevent judicial dilemmas
from arising in the first place by setting up institutional mechanisms to
systematically side-step mandatory minimums where such sentences
would be least appropriate. We begin with the ex post, case-specific
cooperative strategies before turning to the ex ante version toward the end
of this section.
1. Seeking Cooperation from Prosecutors
One of the most natural ways that judges might seek to resolve
judicial dilemmas is to push for cooperation from prosecutors to avoid
charges that trigger unjust mandatory minimum sentences. Such
cooperation can take place while the trial is pending or in progress to
prevent a judicial dilemma from arising. It can also take place ex post-
that is, after a judicial dilemma has arisen-when judges work with
prosecutors to seek a legally available mechanism for imposing a fairer
sentence. Either way, this strategy is case-specific: it focuses on redressing
or ameliorating the unjust punishment of a particular defendant. This
strategy itself comes in several flavors. As we'll see, some judges might
not rest easy with merely requesting prosecutorial cooperation, but in fact
take active steps to compel it.
In a growing trend, several courts have begun employing this sort
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of strategy.159 Particularly in cases involving defendants sentenced under
especially harsh mandatory minimum provisions, some courts were able to
get prosecutors to agree to allow the defendant's conviction to be vacated,
thus allowing the defendant to be resentenced more moderately after
pleading guilty to lesser charges that did not carry a mandatory minimum.
Despite being used in a variety of cases, 1 6 0 this is often referred to as the
161Holloway doctrine, after the 2014 case of United States v. Holloway.
In the mid-1990s, District Judge John Gleeson was required to
sentence Francois Holloway to fifty-seven years, on the basis of two
"stacked" gun charges under § 924(c), each carrying a mandatory
minimum of twenty-five years' imprisonment.162 Once the appeal and the
standard post-conviction litigation concluded, 16 3 Judge Gleeson issued an
order in February 2013 asking Attorney General Loretta Lynch to consider
agreeing to vacate Holloway's convictions so that he could be
resentenced. 1 6 4 "Recognizing that there were good reasons to revisit
Holloway's excessive sentence but no legal avenues or bases for vacating
it," Judge Gleeson requested "the United States Attorney [to] consider
159 See Richard A. Serrano, Cocaine smuggler serving 140 years freed early, part of
national trend, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2015 (http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-
prisoner-release-20 1509 16-story.html).
160 See United States v. Rivera, No. 83-00096-01-CR (E.D. Okla. Sept. 21, 2015); Drug
Lifer Luis Rivera Released Tuesday Under New "Holloway" Doctrine
(http://clemencyreport.org/lifer-luis-rivera-released-tuesday-under-holloway-doctrine/);
Clair Johnson, Judge cuts 159-year sentence in casino robbery case, BILLINGS GAZETTE,
Oct. 27, 2010 (http://billingsgazette.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/judge-cuts--year-
sentence-in-casino-robbery-case/article_9c4c5966-e le4-1 1df-b934-00 1cc4cO3286.html)
(discussing Judge Richard Cebull's efforts to get the prosecutor to agree to the court's
granting defendant Marion Hungerford's habeas petition, so that the court could vacate
her sentence of 159 years and resentence her to seven years for lesser offenses). See also
United States v. Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310, n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (describing other
cases from the same District in which a similar procedural mechanism had been
employed).
161 United States v. Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
162 Id. at 312-13.
163 Id. at 313-14 (describing Holloway's direct appeal and habeas petitions).
164 Id. at 314.
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exercising her discretion to agree to an order vacating two or more of
Holloway's [firearms convictions under] 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).. ."165 The
procedural mechanism at work here was the Rule 60(b) motion Holloway
had filed in 2012 to re-open his earlier habeas petition,166 arguing that his
sentence was unjust but that he had no other legal avenues available to
him by which to seek justice.167 Holloway had served twenty years by then
and had been an exemplary prisoner, and the Judge felt Holloway
deserved better treatment.168 But in July 2013, Attorney General Lynch
initially denied Judge Gleeson's request, arguing that Holloway's proper
avenue of relief was to request clemency from the President. 169
Judge Gleeson then issued a second order on May 14, 2014
requesting that the Attorney General reconsider her decision. 170 The
reason was that the President had in the meantime issued new guidelines
for clemency decisions, which said that nonviolent offenders were to be
prioritized.17 1 Since Holloway had committed robbery, he would not have
qualified for clemency under the new rules. 17 2 Judge Gleeson's strongly
worded order requested that the prosecutors reconsider their decision to
continue opposing the vacatur of Holloway's conviction. In fact, the order
concluded by supplementing the high-minded appeal to conscience with
165 id.
166 id.
167 Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) states that "[o]n motion and just terms, the
court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding" not only on the basis of conditions like "mistakes" or "newly discovered
evidence," but also for "any other reason that justifies relief." F.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1)-(6).
168 Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d at 314.
169 id.
170 Id. at 314. See also United States v. Holloway, Order, No. 01-CV-1017, Dkt. # 54
(E.D.N.Y.) (order requesting the Attorney General to reconsider)
(http://www.schlamstone.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/holloway.pdf).
171Id. at 4 (noting that "[r]ecent events make it clear that clemency is not a realistic
avenue to justice for Holloway"); see also Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d at 314.
172 See Holloway Order, supra note 170, at 4 (observing that "the fact that Holloway
committed crimes of violence will disqualify him" under the new clemency rules);
Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d at 312, 314.
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several concrete threats: the Judge stated that unless the prosecutors
cooperated, he would reopen several constitutional issues in the case,
which would require a great deal of briefing from the prosecutor's
office. 173
The prosecutors agreed to the court's second request and stated
that they were willing to drop their opposition to the motion to reopen
Holloway's habeas petition. 17 4 That gave the court the authority to vacate
Holloway's conviction, and going forward the prosecution agreed to drop
the "stacked" gun counts with the mandatory minimums. 17' Thus,
Holloway's sentence could be dramatically reduced. He was subsequently
resentenced to time served. 17 6
Once the defendant has pursued all legally available avenues of
relief, this sort of advocacy by the court seems uniquely appropriate. It is a
meaningful step the judge can take to help right the moral wrong he or she
was forced to impose. Moreover, even if the judge ultimately fails to get
prosecutors to agree to vacate the defendant's sentence, as happened in
Holloway, the defendant will at least see the court acting forcefully on his
173 See Holloway Order, supra note 170, at 5. The court explained:
In the absence of a government agreement to reopen the sentencing, I will
address the pending application to reopen Holloway's collateral challenge
to his conviction. The extraordinary trial penalty in this case may warrant
further briefing on the constitutional issues raised by such a use of
prosecutorial power. In addition, though I long ago rejected a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's admission in his
opening statement that Holloway in fact robbed the three victims of their
cars, upon further reflection I may direct a closer inspection of that issue as
well.
Id.
174 Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d at 315.
175 Id. at 315-16.
176 Monique 0. Madan, At Behest ofJudge, U.S. Shortens Man's 57-Year Mandatory
Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/nyregion/at-
judges-behest-us-shortens-mans-57-year-mandatory -sentence. html (noting that
Holloway, "who had been serving a 57-year mandatory federal prison sentence was
resentenced on Tuesday to time served").
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or her behalf, which likely would be felt to count for something.
Thus, requesting cooperation from prosecutors can be an effective
way to resolve a judicial dilemma-provided the requested cooperation is
given. This, however, highlights a drawback of cooperative strategies in
general: there is always a risk that the requested cooperation will not be
forthcoming. That risk would be especially pronounced in jurisdictions
where prosecutors have been given institutional incentives to seek as many
convictions as possible, with the most severe sentences available.
2. Compelled Cooperation
If cooperation is requested and refused, judges might nonetheless
use other tools at their disposal to elicit it. To give this approach a name,
we might call it the strategy of compelled cooperation. The idea is to
create competing institutional incentives for the relevant legal actors to
collaborate in finding morally preferable outcomes. In the case of
prosecutors, it is worth bearing in mind that they are repeat players in the
courtroom, and so judges have numerous tools at their disposal to pressure
prosecutors to help find ways to avoid the most extreme injustices caused
by mandatory minimums.
Holloway itself demonstrates what the compelled cooperative
strategy might look like. Judge Gleeson showed himself willing to insist
quite forcefully on prosecutorial cooperation toward seeking a more
morally defensible sentence for Mr. Holloway, who otherwise faced a
prison term the judge himself dubbed "excessive."1 7 7 Recall the court's
threat to create substantially more work for the prosecutor's office by
reopening several constitutional issues in the case unless the prosecutors
agreed to cooperate in securing a more just outcome for Mr. Holloway.17 8
This amounts to imposing concrete consequences for prosecutors in the
177 Holloway, 68 F.Supp.3d at 314.
17s See Holloway Order, supra note 170, at 5 (declaring that "[t]he extraordinary trial
penalty in this case may warrant further briefing on the constitutional issues raised by
such a use of prosecutorial power," as well as re-briefing other issues).
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event that they unreasonably withhold cooperation; a prosecutor seeking
to maximize convictions within considerable time constraints will
naturally wish to avoid having to engage in complex, time-consuming
constitutional analysis in order to secure a single conviction.
In this way, the court did not merely request cooperation, but took
active steps to extract it. There are a variety of concrete consequences that
judges might take to elicit cooperation where it is not forthcoming.
Mandatory minimums might erode judicial discretion over sentencing, but
they do not erode judicial discretion over a wide range of procedural
matters that affect individual prosecutors. To be clear, our claim here is
not that judges should engage in any form of prejudicial treatment of
prosecutors that violates the law or is otherwise legally unsupportable.
That, of course, would not satisfice the law's demands and so would not
count as a Satisficing Option. However, a judicial action can be legally
permissible even if it is not the absolutely top-ranked option in terms of
the applicable legal reasons. If judges use procedural rulings to elicit
cooperation from prosecutors who might otherwise withhold it (perhaps
unreasonably), this might be sub-optimal by the lights of the law, but still
legally permissible. This allows for a kind of forceful advocacy in pursuit
of outcomes that are both legally and morally satisfactory, and can be a
promising way to resolve judicial dilemmas in this context. Schematically,
the strategy is to create incentives for prosecutors to push them to
cooperate in seeking legally available resolutions of particular cases that
are morally preferable.
One might object that this approach is too little too late for Mr.
Holloway. It is merely a post hoc fix to a wrong that has already
happened, and this, one might fairly argue, is not nearly as good as
avoiding the wrong in the first place.
We think this is a legitimate concern in Mr. Holloway's case. But
in principle, there are ways to avoid it. One could imagine judges
signaling to the parties set to appear before the court what the
consequences will be for failing to cooperate as needed in pursuit of
justice. For example, the judge might adopt a standing policy-perhaps in
the form of a local rule-requiring prosecutors to cooperate to avoid
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triggering mandatory minimums in cases where it is most likely to result
in excessive sentences, and not merely at the sentencing stage, but also
with respect to initial charging decisions. Although Attorney General Jeff
Sessions has recently ordered that the DOJ policy going forward will be to
always charge defendants with the most serious offense that is
available, 179 judges might seek to counteract this development by
establishing standing policies that require cooperation from individual
prosecutors in pursuit of more restrained charging decisions, as well as
less severe positions with regard to sentencing. Indeed, a judge could, in
principle, back up such a standing policy with the sort of threat made by
Judge Gleeson in Holloway to the effect that failing to cooperate in pursuit
of more moderate sentences would yield an onerous workload and could
result in personal inconvenience for non-cooperative prosecutors in
extreme cases. In a similar vein, the National Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers suggests that defense attorneys move for the court to
order prosecutors to comply with the applicable ethical rules in order to
give these rules more bite in the event of serious non-compliance.180
The array of steps that fall within the strategy of compelled
cooperation is limited only by the judge's imagination-and the law. An
even bolder idea that might appeal to some judges (if not all) would be to
demand, as a condition for appearing before the court, that prosecutors
sign a pledge in which they promise to cooperate in pursuit of justice
179 See Sessions, supra note 43; see also Kevin Johnson, Attorney General JeffSessions
Enacts Harsher Charging, Sentencing Policy, USA TODAY, May 12, 2017,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2017/05/12/attomey-general-jeff-sessions-
enacts-harsher-charging-sentencing-policy/ 101571324 (reporting that "Attorney General
Jeff Sessions is directing federal prosecutors to seek 'the most serious' criminal charges
against suspects").
1so Barry Scheck and Nancy Gertner, Combatting Brady Violations With An 'Ethical
Rule' Order for the Disclosure ofFavorable Evidence, THE CHAMPION, May 2013,
https://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=28478 ("What the defense attorney should do
to make the 'ethical order' motion is very straightforward: File a pretrial motion that
tracks and cites the relevant ethical rule of the defense attorney's jurisdiction... [and a]sk
for an order that the prosecutor search her file and disclose all information that 'tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense"').
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where charging and sentencing is concerned. Violating the pledge could
then form the basis for sanctions should reasonable cooperation be
arbitrarily or unjustifiably refused. For example, had such a pledge been in
effect in Holloway, the prosecutors refusing to cooperate to provide a legal
avenue for imposing a more appropriate sentence on Mr. Holloway could
perhaps have been deemed non-cooperative, which could trigger concrete
consequences for violating the pledge.
Of course, using such a heavy hand in extracting cooperation
carries risks. Most importantly, it risks undermining the appearance of the
court's neutrality. Accordingly, quite some care would have to be taken by
the court in crafting a standing policy of this sort in order to remain neutral
between litigants and merely demand a cooperative approach by all
involved in pursuit of just case outcomes. Perhaps the policy could be
specifically limited to cases where mandatory minimums are implicated.
To further minimize the threat to the appearance of judicial neutrality,
perhaps the forceful mechanisms designed to promote cooperation from
litigants in avoiding overly harsh sentences would be triggered only post-
conviction, once the relevant facts have been legally established by a jury
or by plea. If it then becomes clear that, for example, the prosecution
behaved in a non-cooperative manner through overly aggressive charging
decisions (e.g. involving a frivolous use of "stacking"), and then continued
to refuse to cooperate in pursuit of moderation at the sentencing stage,
then and only then, the suggestion goes, would the relevant sanctions in
the standing policy be triggered. Crafting the court's policy in such a way
would help lessen the risks to the perception of judicial neutrality. What is
more, the judge's efforts to elicit cooperation from litigants need not all
take the form of threatened burdens; instead, they might involve efforts to
name and laud parties who have been especially helpful and cooperative in
pursuit of justice-as the prosecutors in Hungerford proved to be."'
Given all this, we think that using the judge's unique position to
put pressure on litigants to work together to avoid excessive sentences-
perhaps especially in cases like Holloway-can be a promising way for
1"' See United States v. Hungerford, 465 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2006) (Reinhard, J.,concurring).
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judges to navigate the conflict between their legal and moral reasons
where mandatory minimums are concerned. 18 2 The compelled cooperative
strategy must be executed with care, bearing in mind the crucial
importance of minimizing the threat to the perception of the court's
neutrality and commitment to the rule of law. But used within appropriate
limits, we suggest that it can be an effective tool for resolving judicial
dilemmas. This is just another way to say that pursuing such strategies
within proper limits can amount to the sort of Satisficing Option we
expressed sympathy for above.
3. Ex Ante Cooperative Strategies
Thus far, we have focused on case-specific strategies that aim-
with varying degrees of forcefulness-to enlist the cooperation of litigants
in pursuit of more just sentences. Besides the worries about judicial
neutrality posed by more aggressive forms of compelled cooperation, a
further concern about case-specific cooperative strategies is their ex post
nature. As noted above, some might worry that seeking cooperation from
prosecutors to re-open Mr. Holloway's conviction was too little too late.
So, might there be ways for the judiciary to intervene earlier, in
collaboration with prosecutors, to avoid imposing harsh sentences on
particular low-level offenders, thus preventing judicial dilemmas from
arising as frequently in this context? Moreover, is there a way for the
judiciary to intervene more systematically to reduce the burdens that
mandatory minimums bear on a broad class of defendants who are brought
before courts?
182 It seems there are several kinds of moral reasons that apply in this context. First, it
seems judges have moral reasons to make up for the wrong that she personally commits
by applying overly harsh mandatory minimums without sufficient efforts to avoid or
mitigate this result. Second, judges plausibly also have moral reasons to avoid unjust
sentences owing to mandatory minimums in general, which the judiciary can at least be
complicit in, even when the specific case in question does not involve sentencing
anybody unfairly. The measures taken by Judge Gleeson in Holloway help satisfy the first
set of moral reasons. The standing policy demanding cooperation from prosecutors in
pursuit of just sentencing would be a way to comply with the second set of reasons.
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We think that there is. In addition to taking expost steps to assist
particular defendants who have already been haled before the court, judges
have strong reasons to consider ex ante cooperative strategies that seek to
divert defendants away from the criminal justice system in the first place.
One obvious example of such a strategy that judges have pursued in some
jurisdictions is to use, or work to establish, an alternative sentencing
program.
One success story in this vein is the Conviction and Sentencing
Alternative ("CASA") Program that has operated in the Central District of
California since 2012.183 It aims to provide those charged with felonies
with an alternative to prosecution, conviction, and incarceration. For a
person charged with a crime to be selected for the program, broad judicial
cooperation is required: the participating judge, the Pretrial Services
Agency, the U.S. Attorney's office and the Federal Public Defender's
office must all agree that the person selected is a suitable candidate. 184 The
participant enters a guilty plea under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), which, upon
successful completion of the program, binds the CASA judge to either
dismiss the charges or enter a non-custodial sentence. 185 Successful
completion of the program requires that there are no disqualifying
relapses.186 During the program, the participant is not incarcerated, but is
supervised by the Pretrial Services Agency.1 87
Two groups of defendants are eligible for the program. The first
covers those with no criminal history to speak of, "whose criminal conduct
appears to be an aberration that could appropriately be addressed by
supervision" and rehabilitative programs. 188 The second encompasses
183 The Central District of California's Conviction And Sentence Alternatives ("CASA")
Program at 1, http://colsontaskforce.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/4.-Cardona-
Testimony.pdf.
184 id.
185 Id. at 3.
186 Id. at 4 ("repeated failures and relapses will result in graduated sanctions up to and
potentially including termination from the program").
187 Id. at 1.
188 Id. at 1.
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those with more serious criminal histories, "whose criminal conduct
appears primarily motivated by substance abuse or similar issues," and for
these defendants, intensive treatment is typically part of the CASA
program. 189 The program generally excludes defendants charged with
more serious offenses like child pornography, narcotics distribution, or
violent crimes.190
The heart of the CASA program is a course of monthly meetings
between participants and CASA team members (the judge, prosecutor, or
other court officials) in a courtroom. 191 These sessions are devoted to
discussion between CASA participants and the CASA team members. The
discussions are "intended to encourage self-recognition of the underlying
causes, acceptance and understanding of the sanctions imposed." 192
Notably, the CASA program assumes that "there will be failures and
relapses," which are subject to increasing sanctions up to termination from
the program.193 Accountability is not imposed top-down by the CASA
team (e.g. a judge or a prosecutor); rather, CASA participants hold each
other accountable. 1 9 4 The Central District of California's CASA program
has graduated well over 100 participants at this point, 195 and its creators
believe it is a success.196
189 Id.
190 Id. at 2.
191 Id. at 3.
192 Id. at 4.
193 id.
194 Id. (noting that the CASA discussion group thus is autonomous and egalitarian in the
sense that other "program participants play an integral role in emphasizing the need for
truthfulness, often providing examples of their own failures and relapses, their own
efforts to lie about and fabricate excuses for these failures and relapses, and what has and
has not worked for them in trying to come to grips with and address them").
195 Id. at 2.
196 Id. (quoting one District Court judge who asserts that the program demonstrates that
"even those who have committed crimes, can change for the better, and that given a little
help they can break the vicious cycle of recidivism and failure that we see all too often in
our criminal justice system").
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Making use of a program like CASA thus seems to be a very
promising ex ante way for judges to respond to the judicial dilemmas they
are likely to face where mandatory minimums are concerned. Indeed,
several defendants who would have faced mandatory minimums of five to
ten years have successfully graduated from the Central District of
California's CASA program, and thereby avoided jail time.197 Using a
program like CASA in cases where mandatory minimums would be
especially unjust-which are precisely the cases where the defendant
would be most likely to be a good fit for CASA-is a particularly
attractive option because it avoids doing injustice to the defendant in the
first place, which then requires an ex post response of the sort we
discussed in earlier sections. After all, the program provides a legal
mechanism by which the judge can, via cooperating with prosecutors,
sidestep the need to impose a mandatory minimum sentence on the
defendant at all. Moreover, judges could also take steps with varying
degrees of strength to incentivize prosecutors to participate in such
programs. As before, where the means to generate such incentives are
legally permissible but sub-optimal, pursuing alternative sentencing
programs can constitute a Satisficing Option.
On the other hand, alternative sentencing programs may also face
drawbacks as a way to avoid conflicts between a judge's legal and moral
reasons in the context of mandatory minimums. Some judges may not find
themselves in a jurisdiction in which a program like CASA exists. These
judges could still respond to their judicial dilemmas (past, present, and
future) by working to establish such a program. But that may be a difficult
and time-consuming task.198 Under such circumstances, judges might also
use carrots or sticks (or both) to induce prosecutors and other legal actors
to work together to set up an alternative sentencing program, which could
turn this strategy into a full-fledged Satisficing Option in its own right.
A different limitation of a CASA-style program is that only a narrow
197 d.
198 Indeed, it is not hard to imagine pressure being put on U.S. Attorney's offices not to
participate in alternative sentencing programs like CASA to the extent this can be
portrayed as "soft on crime."
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slice of defendants would be eligible. It is not hard to imagine that some of
the excluded defendants still would be subject to mandatory minimums
that are excessively harsh relative to what they deserve, given the
mitigating factors that might apply in their particular cases. For example,
Mr. Angelos was charged with drug trafficking offenses involving the use
of a firearm, and so it is doubtful that he would be eligible for a program
like CASA.
Nonetheless, alternative sentencing programs have the advantage
of providing a valuable ex ante method for reducing the incidence of
judicial dilemmas in the first place. Working to establish such a program
can figure into a series of steps that together constitute a broad, diachronic
Satisficing Option (we might call it a satisficing package). Moreover,
these programs have the benefit of not merely providing case-specific
remedies, but rather promise to offer a more systemic response to the
threat of judicial dilemmas in the sentencing context in general. 199 They
are thus worth including in the judge's arsenal of responses to judicial
dilemmas. To put the point simply, even when judicial activity that uses or
establishes an alternative sentencing program does not constitute a
Satisficing Option (because it does not strictly resolve an existing judicial
dilemma), it may be a necessary step towards avoiding future judicial
dilemmas before they arise. Plausibly, merely responding to existing
judicial dilemmas is not enough in the eyes of morality, given the
importance of combating systemic injustices flowing from mandatory
minimums. So the same reasons that make it worthwhile to consider how
199 Indeed, such programs could also help defendants who otherwise would be pressured
into accepting unfavorable plea bargains due to the threatened use of mandatory
minimums. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Report: An Offer You Can't Refuse: How US
Federal Prosecutors Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty, 2 (Dec. 5, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-
prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead#page (noting that [p]lea bargaining means
higher sentences for defendants who go to trial," and that "[t]he threat of higher sentences
puts 'enormous pressure [on defendants] to plead"'). By diverting defendants away from
the criminal justice system, alternative sentencing programs help defendants escape the
pressure to plead that they would otherwise face because of harsher sentences should they
elect to go to trial.
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judges should resolve existing judicial dilemmas also warrant
consideration of the legally permissible options for judges to prevent such
dilemmas from arising in the first place.
E. SUGGESTIVE STRATEGIES
The prior two strategies we have been discussing for dealing with
judicial dilemmas have focused on how the judiciary can engage with
other legal actors-especially the executive branch and prosecutors-to
find legal avenues for avoiding or correcting the imposition of morally
unjust sentences. There is, however, one other group of actors in legal
proceedings who have a significant degree of legal power to prevent
unjust mandatory minimum punishments: juries. Juries have the legal
power to nullify the law and prevent unjust punishments. This observation
is the basis for the final strategy that we shall consider: rather than
expressly cooperating with legal actors like prosecutors, judges can
resolve judicial dilemmas by nudging other legal actors like juries to
independently use their discretion in ways that would defuse judicial
dilemmas. While we will focus on the role that judges can play in
suggestively nudging the jury to nullify the law, this example is intended
to illustrate more generally how the judiciary can use legally permissible if
suboptimal means to nudge other legal actors to independently use their
discretion in morally beneficial ways.
Two initial points of clarification should be made about this
strategy. First, what is jury nullification? If the jury is satisfied that the
defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury
have the power to acquit the defendant. When a jury does so because they
believe that a conviction would be unjust (often because they believe that
the resultant sentence would be too severe),200 they "nullify" the law in its
application to that particular case. It is accepted that the jury has the power
to nullify the law; we take no stand on the further, contested issue of
200 Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule ofLaw, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1183 (1997).
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whether the jury has a legal right to do so.2 01
Second, what would it take for the judge to suggest that the jury
nullify the law? There are several possibilities here, which differ in terms
of the extent to which the relevant suggestion is (a) direct or indirect, and
(b) explicit or implicit. On one end of the spectrum, the judge can instruct
the duty to nullify the law by acquittal because a conviction would result
in injustice. On the other end of the spectrum, the judge can indicate that
the defense will be allowed to introduce relevant evidence that ends up
supporting a nullification argument. It is important to keep this spectrum
in mind, as different ways of executing suggestive strategies raise different
moral and legal considerations.
Let us start with directly and explicitly instructing the jury to
nullify the law. In many jurisdictions, explicit nullification instructions are
legally impermissible.20 2 And even if they are legally permissible, many
contend that nullification instructions raise worrisome moral and legal
21 The United States Supreme Court held in its 1895 decision in Sparf & Hansen v.
United States that the jury has the power but not the right to nullify the law. 156 U.S. 51
(1895). More recently, the D.C. Circuit noted that it may "invite chaos" to encourage the
jury to nullify the law. United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1133-34 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (quoting United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002, 1009 (4th Cir. 1969)).
Nonetheless, the court accepted that the jury can legitimately nullify the law in
extraordinary cases. Id. at 1136 (noting that "[w]hat makes for health as an occasional
medicine would be disastrous as a daily diet," and recognizing the "existence of the
jury's prerogative"). See also Lawrence W. Crispo, et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus
Anarchy, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1, 17 (1997). Jury nullification has been estimated to
occur in about 4% of cases. See Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Jury Nullification And Jury
Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 826 n.5 (1990). Nonetheless, it does not
produce much case law, given that acquittals usually do not result in reported decisions.
Major Bradley J. Huestis, Jury Nullification: Calling for Candor from the Bench and Bar,
173 MIL. L. REV. 68, 71 (2002). As a result, it is largely an academic debate "whether or
not juries have a right to nullify, or whether it is just an illegal tradition that is tolerated."
Steve J. Shone, Lysander Spooner, Jury Nullification, and Magna Carta, 22 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 651, 653 (2004).
202 See Weinberg-Brodt, supra note 201 at 832 n.37; United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d
1002, 1006-07 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 910 (1970); United States v
Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 408 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Drefke, 707 F.2d 978, 982
(8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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concerns.203 Even scholars who argue that the jury has the right to nullify
the law have shied away from advocating that the judiciary "explicitly
recommend or actively encourage nullification,",2 0 4 due to the fear that
nullification would become too widespread. It is not clear whether this
fear is well grounded. Empirical evidence does not support the view that
nullification instructions produce unwarranted acquittals, 205 but since
direct and explicit nullification instructions are legally impermissible, this
is a moot point.
Further down the spectrum, judges can directly but implicitly
suggest nullification in how they frame their instructions to the jury.
Specifically, the idea would be to instruct juries that they "may find the
defendant guilty only if her guilt has been established beyond a reasonable
doubt." This language communicates only a necessary condition for when
a jury is permitted to convict, and thereby implicates that the jury can
acquit even when this condition is met without explicitly stating that this is
so. Certain courts have indicated that such instructions are legally
203 See, e.g., Sparf& Hansen, 156 U.S. at 148 (Gray, J. dissenting) ("'while the power of
the jury is admitted, it is denied that they can rightfully or lawfully exercise it, (...). The
law must... have intended, in granting this power to a jury, to grant them a lawful and
rightful power(... )."'(quoting People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. Cas. 366-68)).
204 Aaron McKnight, Jury Nullification as a Tool to Balance the Demands ofLaw and
Justice, 2013 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1130 (2013).
205 See Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact ofJudicial Instructions,
Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 452
(1988); Keith E. Niedermeier, Irwin Horowitz, and Norbert L. Kerr, Informing Jurors of
their Nullification Power: A Route to a Just Verdict or Judicial Chaos?, 23 L. & HUM.
BEHAV. 331 (1999).
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permissible.206 Some scholars defend such instructions on the legal basis
that they are necessary to prevent a judicial deception: if one assumes that
the jury has the right to nullify the law, one can argue that it is
"affirmatively misleading" to instruct the jury that "If you are satisfied
that the defendant's guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then
you must find the defendant guilty." 207 Whether the "may convict"
instruction is legally preferable to the "must convict" instruction, on the
grounds that the latter is deceptive, depends on the contested issue of
whether the jury does in fact have the legal right to nullify the law-an
issue we do not aim to resolve here. However, even if direct but implicit
suggestions were legally permitted, we do not think that this is the morally
best way for judges to execute suggestive strategies. Psychological studies
have found that the subtle implication in the instructions above has little
effect on jury deliberations or verdictS 2 0 8_ in order to increase juror
awareness of their power to nullify, instructions must contain a strong and
206 United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("The totality of
input generally convey adequately enough the idea of prerogative, of freedom in an
occasional case to depart from what the judge says. Even indicators that would on their
face seem too weak to notice-like the fact that the judge tells the jury it must acquit (in
case ofreasonable doubt) but never tells the jury in so many words that it must convict--
are a meaningful part of the jury's total input." (emphasis added)). See also Judge B.
Michael Dann, The Constitutional and Ethical Implications of "'Must-Find-the-
Defendant-Guilty" Jury Instructions, in JURY ETHICS: JUROR CONDUCT AND JURY
DYNAMICS 93-118, 104 (John Kleinig and James P. Levine eds., 2006) (questioning the
validity of so-called "must-find-the-defendant-guilty" jury instructions, and supporting a
'may-find-the-defendant-guilty" instruction instead).
207 Dann, supra note 206 at 104. It is worth noting that others also object to the use of
"must" in this context. See also Judge Jack B. Weinstein, The Many Dimensions ofJury
Nullification, 81 JUDICATURE 168-71 (1998).
208 Irwin Horowitz, The Effect ofJury Nullification on Verdicts and Jury Functioning in
Criminal Trials, 9 L. AND HUM. BEHAV. 25 (1985). See also Joseph A. Hamm, Brian H.
Bornstein, Jenna Perkins, Jury Nullification: The Myth Revisited, in PSYCHOLOGY OF
POLICY-MAKING 49-71 (2013).
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,,209explicit message.
What about indirect ways of executing suggestive strategies? The
suggestion can still be explicit or implicit. In some jurisdictions, the judge
can allow defense attorneys to explicitly advocate for jury nullification in
their closing arguments.210 Here the suggestion is explicit, but the judge
plays an indirect role in allowing the suggestion to be made. The
suggestion can also be indirect and implicit: judges can allow the defense
to admit evidence that happens to support a nullification argument,2 1 1
including evidence of the severity of the mandatory minimum sentence
that would attach to a conviction. This evidence is arguably relevant to the
209 Shari Seidman Diamond, When Ethics and Empirics are Entwined: A Response to
Judge Dann's Nullification Proposals, in JURY ETHICS: JUROR CONDUCT AND JURY
DYNAMICS 119-30, 122 (John Kleinig and James P. Levine eds., 2006).
210 For instance, in New Hampshire v. Elvin Mayo, Jr., the New Hampshire Supreme
Court affirmed the legal permissibility of the trial judge's decision to allow defense
counsel to argue the following in his closing statement: "[I]f you find that the prosecution
has proven to you beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element, you may, or
should, find [the defendant] guilty. You are not required to. You must find him not guilty
if each and every element has not been proven; you may, or should, find him guilty if
each and every element has been proven. You don't have to." 125 N.H. 200, 204 (N.H.
1984). The New Hampshire Supreme Court found that this was legally permissible
because "[t]he jury was expressly made aware of its prerogative to disregard the strict
requirements of the law if it found that those requirements were not being justly applied
in the defendant's case." Id. Notably, not all jurisdictions agree on this issue. In United
States v. Trujillo, the Eleventh Circuit held that "While we recognize that a jury may
render a verdict at odds with the evidence or the law, neither the court nor counsel should
encourage jurors to violate their oath," and hence "defense counsel may not argue jury
nullification during closing argument." 714 F.2d 102, 106 ( 1 1th Cir. 1983). See also
Huestis, supra note 201, at 89-94; Monroe H. Freedman, Jury Nullification: WhatItIs,
and How to Do It Ethically 42 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125 (2014).
211Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification ": When May and Should a Jury
Reject the Law to Do Justice? 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 251 (1993). We put aside other
evidence that could be admitted in order to support a nullification argument in jury
deliberations, such as irrelevant evidence that helps portray the defendant in a
sympathetic light. Not all defendants who are subject to severe mandatory minimums
have an especially sympathetic background, and there is strong resistance-grounded in
case law-to allowing juries to hear irrelevant evidence.
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question of guilt.2 12 If the defendant knew that extremely harsh penalties
would kick in for a particular crime, then the penalties themselves would
be some evidence that the defendant did not do the crime-this is the
"anti-motive" theory. Interestingly, the empirical evidence suggests that
juries are more likely to nullify when informed, implicitly or explicitly, of
their nullification power by an attorney rather than a judge.2 1 3
One legal challenge to this indirect and implicit version of
suggestive strategies is that such evidence is irrelevant to the question of
guilt, and hence legally inadmissible. In Shannon v. United States, the
Supreme Court held that "[i]nformation regarding the consequences of a
verdict is . . . irrelevant to the jury's task, so when a jury has no sentencing
function, it should be admonished to 'reach its verdict without regard to
what sentence might be imposed."' 2 1 4 However, there is a plausible
argument that this decision should be interpreted as endorsing a principle
that is "intended to protect the defense, not the prosecution," proscribing
the admission of evidence about lenient punishments, but not proscribing
the admission of evidence about severe punishments.2 1 5 Moreover, there
are ways to argue that evidence of the applicable sentences is relevant to
the question of guilt. Specifically, the idea here is based on the "long-
approved argument" employed by prosecutors who contend, with respect
to corroborating witnesses with pending criminal charges, that the known
prospect of a criminal sanction for perjury "supports an inference that the
cooperating witness is less likely to have committed an alleged crime."216
212 Jeffrey Bellin, Is Punishment Relevant After All? A Prescription for Informing Juries
of the Consequences of Conviction, 90 BOSTON U. L. REv. 2223 (2010)
(http://www.bu.edu/law/journals-archive/bulr/documents/bellin.pdf).
213 Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact ofJudicial Instructions, Arguments,
and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 446 (1988).
214 Shannon v. United States 512 U.S. 573, 579 (1994).
215 Bellin, supra note 212, at 2240-41. Bellin cites Justice Stevens' argument that
nullification instructions are unlikely to prejudice the defendant as "as there is no need to
give the instruction unless the defendant requests it." Id. (citing Shannon v. United States,
512 U.S. 573, 591 (1994) (Stevens J., dissenting)).
2 16 Id. at 2252.
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The same thinking suggests that criminal defendants are less likely to
commit more serious crimes since these are punished more severely, and
so evidence of sentencing ranges is technically relevant to the question of
guilt and thus not inadmissible.2 17 Given this, we think it plausible that
judges do not have a legal duty to exclude such evidence; admitting such
evidence might be considered to stretch the law, but it does not violate the
letter of the law, and hence would not obviously be legally impermissible.
Thus, this strategy, if implemented properly, can amount to a Satisficing
Option.
Another legal challenge to this indirect and implicit version of
suggestive strategies is that since the jury has no right to engage in jury
nullification, judges should not take steps that increase the likelihood of
jury nullification. This argument also depends on an answer to the
contested question of whether the jury has a right to engage in jury
nullification. Since we wish to take no stand on that issue here, we are
willing to grant this premise for the sake of argument. Instead, we reject
the inference from this premise to the conclusion that judges should not
take steps that increase the likelihood of jury nullification. We think that
even if they are nudged by the judge or the defense, the jury and its
members make autonomous decisions about whether to nullify the law.
This is a novus actus interveniens, and it severs any legal responsibility
that judges might be thought to have over the nullification outcome. In
other words, even if there is a causal chain from acts by the judiciary to
nullifications by juries, the judiciary arguably is not responsible for the
independent decision of juries to nullify.
For these reasons, we think that some suggestive strategies are
legally permissible even if they may not be legally ideal: they satisfice the
legal reasons at play. We also think that there are good moral reasons to
engage in this strategy. Most obviously, it can improve the defendant's
odds of avoiding unjustly harsh mandatory minimums. Less obviously, it
provides a further disincentive to prosecutors who would seek to
strategically apply severe mandatory minimums in contexts where they
2 1 7 d.
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would not be warranted. Given that this strategy is available wherever
severe mandatory minimum provisions are applied, it could provide a
significant constraint on prosecutorial discretion even if there is significant
debate about the legality of providing exculpatory evidence regarding the
consequences of a verdict. Insofar as prosecutors aim to maximize their
track record of "wins" and resolve trials quickly, they have strong
incentives to both avoid nullifications on slam-dunk convictions and not
get drawn into the time-consuming litigation of evidentiary questions. In
this way, suggestive strategies have some of the same benefits as
compelled cooperative strategies.
III. ARE SATISFICING OPTIONS AN INTOLERABLE THREAT TO THE
RULE OF LAW?
Perhaps the most serious objection that could be leveled against the
strategies above is that they are not genuine Satisficing Options because of
the risks that they pose to important rule of law values. For instance, some
might object that these strategies could be co-opted by advocates of any
possible conception of what justice or morality demands-even ones that
to some might seem deeply troubling-in order to push for whatever case
outcomes this or that judge happens to prefer. This is a familiar concern in
discussions of judicial lawlessness: Jeffrey Brand-Ballard calls it "mimetic
failure." 218 This is Brand-Ballard's term for scenarios in which one
group's at least perceived deviation from the accepted norms induces
another group to deviate themselves in sub-optimal ways that mirror the
behavior of the former group, thus leading to a breakdown of coordination
around the relevant norms.219 The risk of mimetic failure provides an
important moral argument in favor of the practices advocated by Legalists:
2 Brand-Ballard, supra note 57 at 207 ("Mimetic failure occurs when deviation by
Group 0 provokes another judge to deviate in an optimal-result case. But for the latter
judge's reaction, the group's deviation would not have had this negative effect."). Similar
points are made about justified civil disobedience more generally. See, e.g., WILLIAM
SMITH, CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 6-7 (2013).
219 Brand-Ballard, supra note 57 at 207.
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they argue on this basis that courts should only apply the accepted legal
rules, lest the courts descend into chaotic forums for the airing of each
judge's personal views on partisan political issues. Since this concern, like
other concerns about the rule of law, reflects important moral
considerations, it should be clear how it is relevant under the conceptual
framework we provided in Part II. It can change the balance of moral
reasons, and so what initially may have appeared to be a Satisficing
Option would become morally impermissible, and hence not a Satisficing
Option at all.
As we have emphasized throughout this article, some rule of law
concerns do arise with each strategy we consider; however, such concerns
do not arise in each case with equal force. Consider Expressive Strategies.
Say that it became much more common for judges like Cassell to express
their outrage at the injustices inflicted on defendants like Weldon Angelos.
This may carry some risk that judges more generally would express their
personal views on partisan issues. But would that cost be so great as to
render Cassell's expressions of opposition to mandatory minimums
morally impermissible? This seems doubtful. Since some of the moral
significance of Expressive Strategies comes from how the judiciary can
stimulate democratic debate, the costs of mimetic failure here do not seem
prohibitive. We think that this objection at best could show that some of
the strategies that we have laid out are not Satisficing Options; we do not
think it shows that there can be no Satisficing Options.
More importantly, we do not think that this concern shows that any
of the strategies that we have analyzed are flatly ruled out as Satisficing
Options-for three reasons. First, these strategies can be restricted in
simple ways that attenuate concerns about the erosion of rule of law
values. We will continue to focus on mimetic failure here, though we think
the same point applies for other rule of law worries. If the concern is that
judges being influenced by their personal views would make the courts
devolve into chaotic forums on divisive partisan issues, a simple fix would
be to limit these strategies to issues on which the judiciary is united. Under
this proposal, a judge can use Interpretative, Expressive, Assistive,
Cooperative, and Suggestive Strategies only when her views reflect a near-
consensus within the judiciary. Note that this would prohibit judges from
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using these strategies in relation to laws on more controversial issues like
abortion or certain restrictions on speech or religion; but it would not
prohibit judges from using these strategies in relation to unjust mandatory
minimums. The Judicial Conference of the United States has opposed
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions regularly and consistently
220since 1953, and as a matter of "established policy" since at least 1962.
Limiting the above strategies to matters where judicial bodies have a
unified stance is one way to operationalize the idea that departures from
Pure Obedience should be restricted to issues on which there is a broad
moral consensus on the applicable body of law in order to prevent mimetic
failure and address other rule of law-based concerns.
Second, even if our strategies are not restricted in their application
in such a manner, we do not think that rule of law concerns will always
outweigh other moral considerations. It is at least possible that the risks of
mimetic failure or similar breakdowns could be outweighed by, say, the
need to prevent or redress an egregious injustice to particular defendants.
Proponents of the mimetic failure objection may disagree; they may, for
instance, think that concerns about the rule of law are lexically prior to
other moral concerns that the judiciary must consider. But this would
require further argument. That there are risks like mimetic failure does not
in itself show that those risks always dominate other moral concerns, such
as those raised by the near-certainty that Pure Obedience will condemn
some low-level offenders to several decades of incarceration.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even if one argues that rule
of law concerns are lexically prior to other moral concerns, we do not
think that rule of law values always militate in favor of Pure Obedience.
There are at least some cases in which strategies like the ones we
described above on balance promote the rule of law as compared to Pure
220 See Paul Cassell, Statement of Judge Paul Cassell on Behalf of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 19 Fed. Sent. R. 5, at 34-39 (June 2007),
http://constitutionproject.org/pdf/120.pdf (explaining in Part II why "the Judicial
Conference has consistently opposed mandatory minimums for more than fifty years"
and showing in Part III that "the Judicial Conference has considerable company in
opposing mandatory minimum sentences").
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Obedience. A similar point has been recognized in other contexts. One
famous example is Marbury v. Madison, which is credited with
establishing the courts' power of judicial review. 22 1 The authority was at
best dubious for the Supreme Court in this case to exercise judicial review
to strike down an Act of Congress as unconstitutional, and so the Court's
decision in Marbury amounted merely to a questionable assertion of the
222power of judicial review. As such, the legality of the decision was far
from clear. In our terminology, it was legally sub-optimal. Nonetheless,
few doubt that Marbury has enhanced the rule of law as we know it by
enabling the judiciary to serve as a powerful check on the powers of
221 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
222 Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of by, and for the People:
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 20 (2008) (noting
that "Marbury v. Madison's assumption of the right to declare legislation unconstitutional
has been described with some justification as 'a political coup of the first magnitude."');
Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall, and the Politics of Constitutional
Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1203 ("In Marbury, Marshall exercised judicial review
in a way that seems, at least in hindsight, more political than legal. For example, his
opinion relied upon a highly contestable construction of Article III of the United States
Constitution.").
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223Congress and the Executive. As such, some celebrated cases that on
balance promoted the rule of law in part rest on what can be described as
the deliberate use of a legally sub-optimal interpretation of a source of
law-a plausible candidate for what we have been calling a Satisficing
224Option.
The same may well be true in at least some judicial dilemmas that
the courts face today. That may be particularly true in areas where legal
doctrine directly concerns rule of law constraints on the executive, as well
223 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, Suing the President: Nonstatutory Review Revisited, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1612, 1614 (1997) ("in cases as early and prominent as Marbury v.
Madison, courts have taken a leading role in upholding the rule of law by creating
remedies against unlawful government action."). At least this is the traditional view.
Robert M. Casale, Revisiting One of the Law's Great Fallacies: Marbury v. Madison, 89
CoNN. B.J. 62, 62 (2015) ("Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury is credited with
incorporating the doctrine of judicial review into American constitutional law, and
thereby elevating the Supreme Court to the role of guardian of the Constitution.").
However, the actual impact of Marbury in genuinely establishing the power of judicial
review has been questioned by legal historians. See, e.g., Id. at 63-64; Davison M.
Douglas, The Rhetorical Uses of Marbury v. Madison: The Emergence of a "Great
Case", 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 375, 375 (2003) (noting that "[b]etween 1803 and
1887, the Supreme Court never once cited Marbury for the principle of judicial review,"
and arguing that Marbury didn't become a "great case" until the late nineteenth century
when "proponents of an expansive doctrine of judicial review have needed it to assume
greatness"). Nonetheless, the traditional view of Marbury still serves to illustrate at least
the possibility of legally sub-optimal actions promoting the rule of law. The actual impact
of one specific case does not alter our fundamental point.
224 See also Jeffrey Denys Goldsworthy, The Limits of Judicial Fidelity to Law: The
Coxford Lecture, 24 CANADIAN J. L. AND JURIS. 316, 316 (2011) ("It is widely believed
that Chief Justice John Marshall lied in the famous American case of Marbury v.
Madison, in which the doctrine of judicial review of legislation was firmly established for
the first time. It is not that he lied about that doctrine; rather, the claim is that he lied
about the meaning of a statute, by adopting an absurd interpretation of it, in order to raise
the question of judicial review.").
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225- -as administrative and constitutional law. But it is also plausible in
relation to our focal case of judicial dilemmas that arise due to the use or
threatened use of mandatory minimums in criminal trials. One reason why
the judiciary is mostly united in its opposition to many mandatory
minimums is precisely that such provisions threaten to undermine the rule
226of law by transferring discretion from the judiciary to prosecutors, and
generating prohibitive costs to the exercise of the constitutional right to
- 227- -trial by jury. As a result, Satisficing Options-if used judiciously-
could end up promoting the rule of law on balance. The extent to which
this is true for particular Satisficing Options must of course be evaluated
225 For instance, one could imagine the rule of law being strengthened by judicial efforts
to curtail presidential pardons for contempt of court convictions, even if this is done
through a permissible but legally sub-optimal route. Such limits on the presidential
pardon power could help ensure that courts can compel legal officers to act in accordance
with the constitution through contempt of court charges. Of course, how effective this
would be as a way to strengthen the rule of law would also depend on empirical issues,
including how likely it is to provoke "mimetic failure." See supra note 218.
226 See, e.g., Erik Luna and Paul Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOzO L. REV. 1,
13 (2010) ("Mandatory minimums effectively transfer sentencing authority from trial
judges to federal prosecutors, who may pre-set punishment through creative investigative
and charging practices, producing troubling punishment differentials among offenders
with similar culpability."); Id. at 70 (arguing that this practice undermines the
"independent role of judges in sentencing" via the "effective transfer of that power to the
executive branch" (internal citations omitted)). See also references therein. For an in-
depth discussion of the considerable role that this transfer of power to prosecutors seems
to have played in relation to mass incarceration, see John Pfaffs interesting new book.
JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION 127-60 (2017).
227 See Human Rights Watch, An Offer You Can't Refuse: How US Federal Prosecutors
Force Drug Defendants to Plead Guilty (December 5, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/12/05/offer-you-cant-refuse/how-us-federal-
prosecutors-force-drug-defendants-plead (providing a detailed study of this of "trial
penalty"). As Judge Rakoff has argued, one result of this trial penalty is that 2-8% of
convicted felons who plead guilty are estimated to be innocent. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why
Innocent People Plead Guilty, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, 8 (November 20, 2014),
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/11/20/why-innocent-people-plead-guilty/ (asking
"[h]ow prevalent is the phenomenon of innocent people pleading guilty," and noting that
"criminologists... estimate that the overall rate for convicted felons as a whole is between
2 percent and 8 percent.").
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on a case-by-case basis, but we believe we have shown that this is at least
a live possibility that is worth taking seriously.
CONCLUSION
Judicial dilemmas seem likely to become increasingly pressing in
the context of cases involving low-level criminal offenders like Weldon
Angelos or unlawful long-term immigrants like Magana Ortiz. Despite
this, the ethics of judicial dilemmas remains neglected in jurisprudence
and philosophy. Our intention has not been to settle the debate about what
judges should do in such cases; rather, we have sought to stimulate that
debate by showing that the choice between the legalist's strategy of pure
obedience and the moralist's strategy of disobedience is often a false
dichotomy. While judges frequently face decisions involving a serious
tension between the applicable moral and legal reasons, they can still seek
options that are good enough by the lights of both morality and law. That
is, they can seek Satisficing Options along the lines of the strategies we
discussed above. In doing so, they can avoid the worst features of both the
moralist and legalist options. Satisficing Options need not substantially
undermine the rule of law; yet they still help to prevent, or at least
ameliorate, serious injustices done at the hands of the law.
Judge Reinhardt began with the powerful observation that among the
victims in unjust legal outcomes in cases like Ortiz "are judges who,
forced to participate in such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and
humanity as well," and he concluded: "I concur as a judge, but as a citizen
I do not".228 In defending Satisficing Options as a way to resolve judicial
dilemmas, our hope has been to identify ways in which judges can carry
out their legal duties without suffering a loss of dignity and humanity, and
thereby concur not only as a judge, but also as a citizen.
228 Magana Ortiz v. Sessions, No. 17-16014, slip op. at 8.
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